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The main objective of this thesis is to investigate the determinants of firm growth in 
young REITs with the view that REITs with its unique operating conditions may have 
different implications for new venture growth. This study aims to (a) document growth 
characteristics of REITs, (b) empirically examine different growth determinants of 
REITs, (c) explore different growth strategies adopted by REITs, and (d) investigate the 
dual relationship between growth and profitability in REITs. A detailed examination of 
the evolution over a decade of 90 REITs founded in 1993 and 1994 reveals that young 
REITs typically follow a continuous growth path in its nascent years. We find positive 
persistency in growth rates in young REITs, but sustained growth among REITs beyond 
five years is rare. On the probability of survival, we find that REITs‟ failure rate declines 
with size and age. Also, new REITs that experience high growth in its early years are 
more likely to survive longer. We use GMM-system estimator to test a dynamic panel 
data model of firm growth. Using data on 148 US equity REITs that had its IPO during 
the period 1993-2005, we find that REITs‟ growth is inversely proportional to its size 
and leverage and directly related to cash flow, Tobin‟s Q and institutional ownership. 
Age shows a non-linear relationship with growth whereas insider ownership does not 
influence growth in REITs. Strategy wise acquisitions have been the preferred route for 
external growth compared to property development which is considered to be risky. 
Finally, we find a small positive influence of profit rates on subsequent growth and a 
positive and significant influence of growth on profits. We reject the proposition of 
“Penrose effect” as we find that asset growth in REITs lead to a higher profit rate. 
Keywords: REITs, Firm Growth Determinants, Firm Growth Strategies, Growth and 
Profitability 
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 Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) have come a long way from 1960s 
when it was created in the United States to be passive investment vehicles for real 
estate.1 Over the past two decades REITs have grown phenomenally in size and 
importance and have started functioning as growth oriented real estate operating 
companies.2 This unprecedented growth, to a large extent, can be attributed to a 
host of positive regulatory changes that the REIT structure has undergone after the 
Tax Reform Act (TRA) in 1986. The “new-REIT” era, as it is called post 1992, has 
witnessed a plethora of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) and with it the formation of 
many new high growth ventures in the REIT sector.3 The primary objective of many 
of these young REITs has been to grow aggressively in the initial years of its 
inception. This is evident from the high asset growth rates of REITs (Figure 1.1) 
during its nascent years. There can be diverse reasons for the growth motivations of 
REITs in its formative years like achieving economies of scale earlier (to attain 
critical size and spread fixed costs) and gaining competitive edge in the market in a 
shorter time. On the positive side, bigger REIT size encourages institutional 
ownership and analyst tracking, improves stock liquidity and helps in attracting and 
retaining top quality employees. But, on the flip side, unbridled growth can also be 
the result of empire building motives of unethical mangers whose remuneration is 
                                                   
1 A brief history of the emergence of REITs in USA is provided in Appendix. 
2 REITs‟ phenomenal growth in the US is evidenced by the change in its average size of total assets from a 
mere $193 million in the beginning of 1993 to $3.95 billion by the end of 2010. 
3 According to NAREIT statistics, 90 REITs were incorporated in the years 1993 and 1994 combined. Other 
waves of REIT IPOs were seen in 1997-98 with 42 new issuances and in 2003-05 with 29 new equity 
issuances. 
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often tied to the assets under management and who want to thwart any takeover 
attempt by growing bigger in size.   
Figure 1.1: Average asset growth rates with age (from IPO) 
This figure depicts the decreasing rate of asset growth over the years since firm listing. Data is 
obtained from SNL Financials for REITs that had its IPO from 1993 onwards.  
 
 Whatever be the growth motivation of a young firm, growth in its nascent 
years is a vital indicator of its survival. Since, new ventures are subject to “liability of 
newness4 and smallness”, their survival may be significantly reduced in the absence 
of growth (Buederal et al, 1992). This is supported by the fact that out of the 90 new 
REITs that had its IPO in 1993 and 1994 combined, 70 (78%) survived by the end of 
five years and only 35 (39%) survived after 15 years.5 Looking at the same cohort, 
REITs that did not survive the first five years had a three year compound annual 
growth rate (CAGR) in total assets of 34.45%. The three year CAGR for firms that 
survived more than 5 years but less than 10 years was 38.88% and for the firms that 
                                                   
4 The term “liability of newness” was termed by Stinchcombe (1965) to indicate the phenomenon of limited 
probability of performance (or survival) related to new firms. 
5 A firm is defined as new for the first five years of its existence. This is in line with the OECD definition of 
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survived more than 10 years was 42.64%. We find that surviving REITs show a 
higher compound annual asset growth rate during the early years compared to 
those that did not survive. Hence, higher growth rate for REITs during the initial 
years of its birth is crucial for its long term survival. Hence, we focus our study on 
the REIT sector, in which firms face similar investment opportunities and financial 
constraints, and examine the various predictors of new venture growth. Since, 
young REITs in our sample exhibit a higher asset growth variance (82%) compared 
to established REITs (38%), we also look at the various determinants of growth in 
new REITs to address the question of differential growth, i.e., why some new REITs 
grow more than the others.  
1.2 Research Motivation and Significance 
Firm growth has been studied extensively in entrepreneurship, industrial 
organization and strategy literature. The focus of the past firm growth studies has 
predominantly been the manufacturing industry with a limited number of studies 
undertaken in the service sector industry. Despite the large number of studies, little 
work has been done to examine the growth factors and growth strategies in REITs. 
It is difficult to make comparisons with earlier firm growth literature as idiosyncrasy 
in the growth rates and the heterogeneity of firms has made it difficult to generalize 
across the growth experiences of the firm (Coad, 2009). Audretsch et al. (2004) 
concluded from their study of the Dutch hospitality industry that the growth 
dynamics of manufacturing industry may not be applicable to the service industry. 
Though some empirical results show that firm growth is characterized by random 
shocks that none of the determinants of firm growth can explain, it is still possible to 
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look at industry specific growth determinants to understand the growth dynamics of 
firms. This forms our main motivation to understand and document the growth 
characteristics of REITs. 
Firms adopting REIT status have the advantage of being exempted from 
paying tax at the corporate level. But this favorable tax treatment comes at a cost in 
the form of regulatory rules and constraints that apply to REIT‟s asset ownership, 
income generation, income distribution and organizational structure6. The unique 
regulatory environment constrains growth oriented REITs financially and forces 
them to seek external financing quite often. These unique operating conditions may 
have different implications for firm growth phenomenon and this further motivates us 
to undertake firm growth study in REITs.  
Also, new venture literature has predominantly looked into job creation and 
regional development aspects and has largely disregarded the manner in which 
firms attain growth. We also do not find any prior REIT research that has looked into 
the strategic choices available for young REITs to pursue growth and the growth 
trajectories followed by REITs in its early years. In an effort to fill this void in the 
existing literature, we examine the growth choices available to young REITs and 
ascertain the most popular growth strategy adopted by REITs. Our aim is to 
document the growth characteristics of REITs and empirically investigate the 
determinants of growth in young REITs that can possibly explain its differential 
growth. The emphasis is on the interaction between firm-level characteristics which 
is crucial for a firm to realize growth.   
                                                   
6 A detailed list of legal requirements for US REITs is provided in the appendix. 
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 The inter-relationship between growth and profitability is complex and is the 
reason for mixed picture provided by the empirical evidences. There are theoretical 
arguments that growth affects future profitability and profitability supports future 
growth. But, the exact nature of these relationships and causality remains 
unresolved. Intuitively, it can be argued that firms with better financial performance 
will reinvest their profits for further growth. This means that more efficient and 
profitable firms will have higher growth rates. But, regulations stipulate that REITs 
distribute 90% of its taxable income as dividends, which leaves them with little 
retained earnings to reinvest. This makes the relationship between financial 
performance and expansionary investment even more unique as REITs face the 
constraint of sourcing external financing for further investment. Even though REITs 
can‟t retain majority of its profits for further expansion, profits can act as signal to 
obtain external finance at favorable terms.  
 Also, the empirical evidence from manufacturing sector suggests that the 
actual positive relationship between performance and growth is generally lower than 
expected and in some cases even non-existent (Markman and Gartner, 2002). 
Hence, there is no evidence of universal positive relationship between growth and 
profitability. This anomaly between the theoretical predictions and the empirical 
findings needs to be verified for REITs. How does firm investment and growth rate 
react to the current financial performance of the REIT? Whether the influence of 
profits on growth is more important than the influence of growth on profits?  
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Studying growth strategies and its enablers is significant as it will help 
investors and managers to make wiser investment decisions. Understanding the 
enabling contexts will help managers to formulate growth strategies by looking at 
the firm‟s internal resources and the constraints that the firm has to overcome. It 
would also help REIT managers to make accurate growth projections to assess the 
need of external capital due to capital constraints faced by REITs.7 This 
understanding will also help REIT managers to anticipate potential problems that 
the firms can face by adopting a particular growth strategy and help them overcome 
these problems to preserve firm performance. Investors can also get insights from 
this study in terms of selecting and investing in REITs that show prudent growth 
strategies in tune with the demographic affiliations of the firm. The analysis will also 
help academicians understand the reasons new REITs fail based on firm 
characteristics and the strategies adopted by REITs to grow. Finally, this analysis 
will bring some light in the area of firm growth in REITs and help to fulfill the gaps by 
providing empirical evidence that contributes to a broader understanding of factors 
affecting growth of REITs. 
1.3 Research objectives and Research questions 
This study aims to (a) document growth characteristics of young REITs, (b) 
empirically examine different growth determinants of young REITs, (c) explore 
different growth strategies adopted by young REITs, and (d) investigate the dual 
relationship between growth and profitability in REITs. The focus of our analysis is 
young REITs where growth is imperative for obtaining viability rather than 
                                                   
7 The capital scarcity in REITs results due to the mandatory disbursement of 90% (95% before year 2000) of 
its taxable income as dividends to investors. 
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established firms where firm growth is about sustaining viability (Gilbert et al., 
2006). The choice of a growth strategy is a complex issue for a new firm because of 
the absence of certain resources (Penrose, 1959). Also, predicting growth becomes 
even more important in the case of young REITs due to the absence of any prior 
track record to show to potential investors. Thus, we investigate how different 
resource positions the new REITs start with, take an impact on its strategies and 
ultimately on its performance.  
The research questions that we intend to answer through this study are:  
(1) What firm-specific factors explain the differential growth of young REITs? 
(2) How does REITs’ asset growth react to its current financial performance?  
1.4 Scope of Research 
 The focus of this study is Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) in general 
and young REITs in particular. We restrict our sample to publicly traded equity 
REITs in United States. Though a lot of factors affect firm growth, we specifically 
look for organizational factors that have the greatest impact on firm growth. Our 
focus is on firm-attributes & firm-specific factors in this study and we do not consider 
the human factors like managerial motivations and traits that may have an impact 
on firm growth.  
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is organized into five chapters: 
Chapter 1 provides the background and motivations to conduct this study. The 
research questions, objectives and scope of this study are defined. 
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Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature on firm growth and examines the theories 
on firm growth. Based on the literature review, we develop the testable hypotheses 
for the study. 
Chapter 3 presents the data-set, data source, summary statistics. It describes the 
research design to conduct this study.  
Chapter 4 discusses the empirical findings on determinants of growth and survival 
of REITs. It also discusses the dual relationship between growth and profitability. 
Finally, chapter 5 concludes by summarizing the main findings and contributions to 
the existing literature. It also highlights the limitations of the present study and gives 
recommendations for future research. 
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2. Literature review and Hypotheses 
2.1 Definition of firm growth 
  Growth, in general, can be defined as the change in size or magnitude from 
one period of time to another. For a firm, it is an increase in certain attributes such 
as sales, employment or profit between two points in time and is an important 
determinant of firms‟ performance. Growth also refers to the process of 
organizational change that leads to change in size or productivity of the firm. This 
was highlighted by Edith Penrose (1959) in her seminal book, “The theory of the 
growth of firm” that characterizes growth not only as the increase in amount but also 
as an increase in size or improvement in quality as a result of a process of 
development. Firm growth is a complex phenomenon- multidimensional, hard to 
predict and assess, and can manifest itself in various ways and consequently have 
differential effects on several different levels (Davidsson et al., 2006). Firm growth 
has been addressed both theoretically and empirically in various disciplines 
including economics, psychology, entrepreneurship and strategy. Despite the large 
number of studies, a coherent picture of the phenomenon of firm growth is still hard 
to distil (Davidsson et al., 2005). This is because of the complex, multi-dimensional 
and heterogeneous nature of growth that has left the existing literature highly 
fragmented (Wiklund et al., 2009). The complete understanding of this phenomenon 
is still limited due to the focus of the past studies on a few variables that are 
considered important to respective disciplines. Though, the differences in the 
theoretical approaches, empirical analysis and interpretations of several studies 
Chapter 2  Literature review 
10 
 
have improved the understanding of different aspects of firm growth, the 
multidimensional phenomenon of firm growth makes it unique to the industry setup. 
2.2 Measurement of firm growth 
 Diverse metrics of firm growth have been used in the existing literature.  
Based on extensive literature review, Delmar (1997) and Ardishvili et al. (1998) 
have compiled a list of possible growth indicators: assets, employment, market 
share, physical output, profits, stock market value and sales. Sales and employment 
are the most widely used measures in empirical growth research (Delmar 1997). 
Since, firm growth is fundamentally a multidimensional phenomenon, researchers 
have used different growth measures for different forms of growth (Delmar et al., 
2003). Sales, seems to be the consensus indicator for the preferred measure of firm 
growth as it is easily available and applies to all sorts of firms (Ardishvili et al., 
1998). But use of sales as a precursor of growth has its shortcomings too. For start-
ups like the technology firm, growth in sales may happen at a later stage and assets 
and employment growth may be a better indicator of growth. Also, sales are 
sensitive to inflation and currency exchange rates (Delmar et al, 2003). Employment 
measure may be preferable if the focus of study is the managerial implication of 
growth (Churchill and Lewis, 1983). But, with technological innovations and with the 
substitution of capital for labor, a firm may grow considerably in terms of assets and 
output without any substantial growth in employment.  Measuring growth in assets 
may be problematic if the firms in the sample have different capital intensities and 
also if intangible assets are as important to the company‟s growth prospects. 
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Hence, the selection of growth indicator depends on the research question and the 
type of firms that are included in the sample (Davidsson and Wiklund, 2000).   
 The two basic approaches used in the literature to measure firm growth are 
the absolute and relative growth. Absolute growth measures the absolute increase 
or decrease in numbers of firm size whereas relative growth measures the growth 
rate in percentage terms. Firm growth is usually measured by taking the log-
differences of size.  
    Git = log(Sit) – log(Si,t-1) 
where “Sit” is the size of the firm i at time t. 
Using the log differences instead of relative growth helps in minimizing the effect of 
heteroscedasticity in statistical analysis. But, measuring growth by these two 
methods can often lead to different results (Sheperd and Wiklund, 2009). 
Weinzimmer et al. (1998) found a weak correlation between the different formulae 
for computing growth. Measures of absolute growth are biased towards large firms 
whereas that of relative growth is biased towards smaller firms. To overcome this 
problem, Birch (1981) used a combination of absolute and relative growth (known 
as Birch index) to reduce the impact of firm size. Sometimes, growth rates are also 
scaled down by average size to reduce the ambiguity in results that can arise if the 
initial size is too low. 
 A comparison between the previous studies on firm growth is made difficult 
with the variations in the growth indicators, the growth formula (absolute or relative) 
and the time frame (Delmar et al., 2003). The challenge is to develop better 
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knowledge about the relative and combined effects of many predictors under 
different circumstances (Davidsson et al., 2005). The diversity of measures used in 
the growth studies has made it difficult to generate a cumulative body of knowledge 
(Weinzimmer et al., 1998). The interpretation of growth metric also depends on the 
length of time over which it is measured and due to the possibility of the exit of a 
firm that may again make comparisons misleading. Since there is no one best 
measure of firm growth, some researchers have advocated composite measures 
using multiple indicators (Davidsson, 1989) to measure heterogeneity in firm 
growth. Using multiple measures not only help in providing a “big picture” of the 
empirical relationships but also allow easier comparisons with the earlier studies.   
2.3 Theories on firm growth 
 Over the years various researchers have postulated different theories of firm 
growth. These theoretical perspectives can be broadly divided into four groups: (1) 
classical models; (2) stochastic models; (3) resource based models; and (4) models 
of learning. According to the neo-classical theory, all the firms within an industry are 
pushed - by the existence of a U-shaped long-run average cost curve and by the 
goal of maximizing profit – to expand their size until they reach the scale 
corresponding to the feasible cost (Geroski, 1999). The process of growth is 
exhausted as far as the process of optimization is completed, as there is no 
incentive to grow beyond the optimum size (Hart, 2000). However, this is made 
under the assumption that firm operates in a homogenous product market and can 
easily expand or contract to arrive at the optimal output level. In reality, empirical 
evidence gives a different story about firm growth which is beyond the profit 
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maximizing mechanism. Thus, the main criticism of the classical economist‟s school 
of thought is that it cannot explain the presence of firms whose size is larger than 
the optimum size and how the process of firm growth actually evolves over time. 
 One of the earliest explanations of firm growth behavior was given by Gibrat 
(1931) as the stochastic model of firm growth. In his “law of Proportional effect”, 
Gibrat laid out the principle that growth of firms is a random process and the 
expected increase in firm size is proportional to the current size of the firm. While 
there may be a large number of systematic factors affecting growth, collectively they 
exercise only a limited influence on firms' proportionate growth (Hay and Morris, 
1979).  Gibrat‟s law has been tested by many researchers with differing results. 
Some studies support Gibrat‟s law in totality (Hart and Prais, 1956; Hart, 1962) and 
some support a part of the law (Hymer and Pashigan, 1962) about firm growth 
being independent of firm size. Later studies have found that there is a negative 
relationship between size and growth of a firm (Kumar, 1985; Evans, 1987).  
Several studies have also shown that smaller and younger firms grow at a higher 
rate than the larger and mature firms (Hart, 2000; Glancey, 1998).  
 Penrose (1959), moved away from the traditional emphasis on the size of the 
firm to a resource based view of firm growth. The resource based view considers 
the firm as a collection of resources and the focus is on the activities it can perform 
with those resources. Penrose (1959) analyzed the process of growth in terms of 
the speed with which firms could accumulate and assimilate such resources, and 
the opportunities for further growth which arise when firms‟ internal resources are 
under used. Thus, firms‟ resource characteristics were considered to lead to 
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heterogeneity in the firm‟s performance. Some behavior economists (Baumol, 1962; 
Chandler, 1992) consider that the differences in firm size (and hence firm growth) 
are due to the division between the objectives of control and ownership structures. 
When ownership is separate from firm control, the managers, who control the firm, 
tend to enhance the firm size to maximize their satisfaction instead of firm value. 
Thus, these theories suggest that there are different types of firm behaviors which 
lead to different levels of performance and growth.  
 More recently, models of learning and selection have appeared in the 
existing literature. This approach takes into account the dynamics of the firms and 
their level of efficiency. Thus, firm growth and survival depends on firm‟s capacity to 
learn and adapt its strategies to the changing environment (Geroski, 1995). A model 
of the evolution of industry was proposed by Jovanovic (1982) by subjecting each 
firm‟s cost curve to randomly distributed, firm specific shocks. He concluded that 
over time a firm learns about the effects of these shocks on its efficiency. When 
output is a decreasing convex function of managerial inefficiency, the model implies 
that younger firms will grow faster than older firms (Jovanovic, 1982). His model 
also results in small firms having higher, but more variable growth rates and higher 
failure rates than large firms. Chandler (1992) emphasized on the management of 
the resources in terms of organizational capabilities to explain the beginnings and 
growth of modern industrial enterprises. The literature on organizational capabilities 
and core competencies are better able to explain the heterogeneities between firms 
and offers a plausible, history dependent story of organizational growth and 
development (Geroski, 1999). 
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 There have been attempts to develop stage theories of firm growth that 
outline the changes in the optimum size over the life of firms. Greiner (1972) argued 
that firms evolve through five phases: creativity, direction, delegation, co-ordination 
and collaboration. Mueller (1972) argued that a strictly profit maximizing firm is likely 
to enjoy only a finite burst of growth associated with each innovation. Though the 
stage theories of firm growth are a useful aid for conceptualization, they still fail to 
explain why different firms enjoy different growth rates in each stage. 
 The complexity and the uncertainty surrounding the phenomenon of firm 
growth have led to the emergence of various theories predicting the evolution of 
firm. However, no single theory can give a complete picture of the impact and 
evolution of firm growth phenomenon. In the absence of a complete theory of firm 
growth dynamics, an empirical approach is recommended to seek the stylized facts 
(Coad, 2009).  
2.4 Strategies of firm growth  
 Firm growth is not static in nature. Firms grow in many different ways and the 
patterns of growth can vary significantly and have different causes (Delmar et al., 
2003). Research on firm growth has identified three major strategic choices for firm 
growth, viz., undertaking internal expansion, conducting Mergers & Acquisitions and 
developing trust based network relationships (Peng and Heath, 1996). A firm can 
grow by expansion of the current activities which is referred as “organic growth”. 
Firms can also grow by acquiring existing firms. Trust based relationships are based 
on interpersonal relationships to form networks and alliances. Different types of 
growth have different implications for the firm managers and also have different 
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impact on the firm performance. Firms that grow organically show a smoother 
growth pattern over time compared to firms that grow mainly through acquisitions 
(Penrose, 1959). Firms early in their life cycle and small firms tend to take the 
organic growth path whereas mature and large firms predominantly grow by 
acquiring existing businesses (Penrose, 1959: Davidsson et al., 2006). Firms can 
decide to grow in the domestic market or take their business to the international 
market when the domestic market gets saturated. International growth is more 
associated with large firms as they have the wherewithal to compete and to 
withstand setbacks.  
 Acquisition strategy is used by firms to rapidly achieve growth and 
competitive advantage. Acquisitions can translate into economies of scale, 
improved market reach and visibility through the positive synergies of the two firms. 
But, from societal point of view, organic growth creates new jobs whereas 
acquisitions tend to move existing jobs from one firm to another and sometimes 
may even reduce jobs. Also, growth through acquisitions is faced with various 
challenges of merging organizational cultures and executive overload. The pitfalls 
may be severe if the anticipated synergies of the acquisition are not realized and a 
hefty premium is paid for the acquisition. 
 Though most of the growth research fails to make the distinction between 
organic and acquisition growth when conducting empirical analysis, some 
researchers have specifically tried to understand the growth patterns in high growth 
industries. Delmar et al. (2003), find that 10% of the firms in their sample grew 
primarily via acquisition. Size of the firm also has an influence on the choice to grow 
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organically or through acquisition. Large firms primarily grow by acquiring others 
whereas small firms grow organically (McKelvie and Wiklund, 2010).  
2.5 Growth strategies of REITs 
 REITs‟ growth strategy can broadly be divided into two categories: Internal 
growth and external growth. Internal or organic growth is usually achieved through 
maintenance and improvement of rental income and occupancy rates of the existing 
assets as well as the optimization of asset management quality and costs. Internal 
growth usually takes a longer time as it depends on the availability of resources with 
the firm (Penrose, 1959). Thus, firms that grow organically show smoother but 
slower rates of growth. External growth, on the other hand, is achieved primarily 
through acquiring new income producing properties or developing new properties 
that can earn income in the future. Though REITs have opportunities to increase 
cash flow from its existing properties by providing efficient property and lease 
management, there is a limit to FFO growth that can be achieved by organic growth 
alone.  
 Most REITs typically resort to external growth through expansions, 
acquisitions and property development to achieve faster and substantial growth. 
REITs generally grow by acquiring properties with yield higher than the REITs‟ cost 
of capital. Source of acquisition value comes from increased economies of scale 
and the potential to improve value of the property by better management. 
Acquisition can be in the form of a single asset, a portfolio of assets or merging with 
another REIT or acquiring a private/public real estate company. Traditionally, the 
strategy of merging with other firms is used by well-established firms as an effective 
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external source of growth as younger and smaller firms lack the wherewithal to 
acquire other firms. It is generally believed that young firms are acquisition targets 
and they are rarely considered to be potential acquirers themselves. But, if young 
REITs want to expand rapidly to attain economies of scale then young REITs 
should consider acquiring/merging with its competitors as a viable strategic option.  
 Development on the other hand is considered risky due to construction and 
leasing concerns. Even if some REITs have pre-leasing commitments for some 
portion of development, the changed market conditions by the time the property is 
ready for occupation may result in investments being unprofitable. Though 
development has the potential to create higher returns due to development profits, it 
is dilutive to REITs‟ stock price as it is capital intensive (REITs can‟t retain much 
cash) and provides no cash flow to the bottom line in the short term. Development is 
an option that is irreversible and is expensive and it engenders a higher cost of 
capital due to increased risk. Though real estate values are created by development 
activities, many things can go wrong or change during the period of development as 
seen in the recent financial crisis. Yields are low during the development period 
which may affect the revenue targets. Since, development is considered to be 
increasingly risky, not many REITs undertake this strategy for external growth. Only 
established REITs with proven history of revenue generation can raise the 
necessary capital to weather the development process. According to Brounen et al 
(2000), who study the effects of property development activities on the performance 
of REITs during the period 1993-1999, property development is undertaken mainly 
by large REITs as development activities require a certain size in order to generate 
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spin-offs. They also conclude that REITs specializing in outlet centers and regional 
malls almost always develop property themselves and cite the reason as the 
scarcity of existing properties in these markets during the time period of their study. 
 The growth strategy of REITs depends on the prevailing economic condition 
that has a bearing on the demand and supply of these income producing properties. 
The growth strategy is also dependent on REIT‟s capital raising ability from external 
sources. This proves to be a challenge, especially to young REITs that find it 
difficult to compete with their well-established counterparts. Growth through 
acquisition of properties is the most often path taken by REITs to grow externally as 
compared to growth through development of new properties (Figure 2.1). When we 
look at the REIT acquisitions in general during 1999-2005, we find that REITs with 
retail property focus were the most targeted REIT type for M&A followed by 
residential and hotel. Property development is considered to be relatively risky and 
cash intensive activity and hence is limited to more established REITs as compared 
to young and small REITs.  
 Over the years, REITs have moved from being passive real estate holding 
companies to firms that cater to various real estate services. REITs have also 
evolved by strategic tie-ups and joint ventures with developers and real estate 
operators to add to its asset growth. The REIT modernization Act (RMA) in 2001, 
allowed REITs to own 100% of stock of a Taxable REIT Subsidiary (TRS) that 
provides services to REIT tenants. This has provided an avenue for REITs‟ to 
increase its real estate services like asset management, property management and 
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development consultancy to related and unrelated parties to generate the most 
needed additional income to grow. 
Figure 2.1: REITs investment through acquisition and development (2001-2010) 
This figure depicts that property acquisition is the preferred route for REITs to grow compared to 
property development. The data for total acquisitions and development is obtained from SNL 
Financials. 
 
2.6 Determinants of firm growth 
 Various determinants of growth have been put forward by researchers 
depending on the discipline of study. Researchers from psychology have focused 
on the behavior of the entrepreneur, whereas those from the economics discipline 
have focused on the relation between growth and firm size. Firm growth is 
dependent on the path taken by the organization and is an organizational outcome 
resulting from the combinations of firm specific resources, capabilities and routines 
(Coad, 2009). Firm growth also depends on the prevailing macro-economic 
conditions and on the degree of concentration or competition in the industry.  Zhou 
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and classified the determinants into three dimensions: individual, organizational and 
environmental determinants. 
 Individual determinants depend on the personality traits, growth motivation, 
individual competencies and personal background of the entrepreneur. Zhou and 
Wit‟s (2009) study finds growth motivation, specific skills and need for achievement 
to be the most important individual determinants of firm growth. Even though the 
general economic conditions are favorable and firm may be able to exploit the 
growth in the market with the use of its resource capabilities, manager‟s ability and 
managerial ambition plays a reinforcing effect on the firm growth. Several research 
studies have shown that entrepreneur‟s willingness to grow their firm (growth 
orientation) affects the performance and realized growth of the firm (Wiklund, 1998). 
Motivated managers are able to effectively utilize the resources and select 
appropriate strategies to improve growth. This is especially true for a small firm 
where motivation and the ability related factors of the entrepreneur play an 
important factor in the success of the firm. In empirical studies, growth motivation of 
managers is observed to have a positive effect on growth (Delmar & Wiklund, 
2008).  
 The environmental determinants like dynamism, hostility and heterogeneity 
determine the growth potential of the firms. To some extent growth is externally 
determined by the environment in which it operates. Various studies have 
acknowledged the effect of these determinants but don‟t consider it to be the most 
influential in determining firm growth. Though, growth to a considerable extent is a 
matter of willingness and skill, but the fundamental facilitators and obstacles in the 
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environment cannot be disregarded (Davidsson et al, 2005). Beaudry and Swann 
(2009) in their analysis of the influence of strength of industry cluster have shown 
that for some industries there is a positive association in the firm growth and own 
sector employment. 
 Organizational determinants are found to have the greatest influence on firm 
growth. These determinants have been discussed in the existing literature in the 
form of firm attributes, firm specific resources, firm strategies and organizational 
structure. The most studied firm attribute is age and size. Age of the firm has a 
negative relation with the growth of the firm and this has been empirically supported 
by many studies (Evans, 1987; Dunne and Hughes, 1994; Glancey, 1998; Yasuda, 
2005). Gibrat´s law has been a much revisited benchmark for research on the 
determinants of firm growth since its formulation in 1931 (Sutton, 1997). According 
to the Gibrat‟s law of proportionate effect, firm growth is independent of firm size at 
the beginning of the period. Early studies have found no relationship between rate 
of growth and size of the firm (Hart, 1962; Hymer and Pashigan, 1962). But most of 
the later studies have found a negative relation between firm size and growth 
contrary to Gibrat‟s law (Kumar, 1985; Hall, 1987; Dunne and Hughes, 1994; Almus 
and Nerlinger, 2000; Bottazzi and Secchi, 2003). Though, empirical literature on the 
relationship between firm size and growth has for the most part rejected the 
stochastic model, some have found weak evidence to support Gibrat‟s law for larger 
firms (Mansfield, 1962; Evans, 1987). It has also been empirically supported that 
firm‟s survivability rises with size and age (Jovanovic 1982; Evans 1987; Yasuda 
2005). 
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 Based on the firm specific resources, financial resources and human capital 
are the most important resources for small business growth (Wiklund et al., 2009). 
With access to sufficient financial resources, firms are able to pursue growth 
opportunities. Human capital represents knowledge, skills and experience. This is 
especially crucial for small firms in rapidly changing industry as they have 
constraints in available resources and depend on innovation for future growth. Firm 
strategies include firm‟s orientation to the market needs and the firm‟s response to 
the customer preferences. Firm‟s strategy is basically dependent on the 
entrepreneurial orientation of the top management and its behavior towards being 
proactive and competitive in the market.  Empirical evidence shows that 
entrepreneurial orientation is positively related to growth (Wiklund, 1998). 
Organizational structure, which is related to the distribution of work and the 
mechanism of co-ordination like centralization and formalization, has shown to have 
mixed effects on firm growth. Organizational dynamism like the strategic decision 
making, R&D expenditure and scalability (preparedness to grow) has a positive 
effect on firm growth.   
 Factors that inhibit or hinder growth include the institutional barriers and the 
financial barriers. Institutional barriers include government policies, legal structure 
and taxation related issues. Smaller firms face higher obstacles due to institutional 
policies. Financial barriers represent access to financial resources. Access to 
financial resources depends on the rate of development of a country‟s financial 
sector. As financial development reduces the cost of external financing to financially 
dependent firms, it has a substantial supportive influence on the rate of firm growth 
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(Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Again larger firms are less constrained for finance as 
compared to smaller firms (Ayyagari et al, 2008). Other inhibitors include inefficient 
functioning of financial markets, inadequate security and enforcement of property 
rights, poor provision of infrastructure, inefficient regulation and taxation, and 
broader governance features such as corruption (Ayyagari et al., 2008). 
 Managerial abilities can sometimes constitute the limiting factor for firm 
growth (Penrose, 1959). As the firm grows and matures, there is a tendency of 
managers to pursue growth rather than stockholder‟s welfare. Managers like to 
grow in sales or total assets at the expense of profitability, especially when their 
remuneration, perquisites and power are linked to firm size measured by sales. 
Managers attempt to maximize growth to achieve non-pecuniary rewards like status 
and power and in order to build their own empires. Growing bigger not only gives 
the managers a sense of achievement but it is also a mechanism to prevent any 
hostile takeovers and subsequently their job loss in the future.  
2.7 Growth determinants of REITs 
 Building on past studies, we evaluate the firm growth determinants in REITs 
using the growth determinants established in non-REITs. We also include some 
REIT-specific variables that are unique and compelling predictors of REITs‟ growth.  
a) Firm size and age:  Firm size and age are the most widely studied factors 
of firm growth. Age of the firm has an inverse relation with growth of the 
firm and this has been empirically supported by many studies (Evans 
1987; Dunne and Hughes, 1994; Glancey 1998; Yasuda 2005). We 
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expect the same negative relationship to hold for REITs, i.e., younger 
REITs grow more rapidly than older REITs. Majority of the recent 
empirical literature on the relationship between firm size and growth has 
for the most part rejected Gibrat‟s stochastic model. We also expect to 
find a negative growth-size relationship as newly formed REITs are small 
and need to grow rapidly to achieve the minimum efficient size (Almus 
and Nerlinger, 1999; Audretsch et al., 2004). 
b) REIT Structure: Umbrella Partnership REITs (UPREIT) enables existing 
property owners to contribute properties to REITs, on a tax-deferred 
basis, in exchange for Operating Partnership (OP) units.  The UPREIT 
structure has the tax advantage as compared to traditional structure as 
they pay lower prices to acquire properties. Also, the OP unit holders 
have an incentive to actively monitor firm action. At the same time, OP 
unit holders may face the conflict of interest when it comes to sale of 
properties contributed by them as this may trigger a large capital gains 
tax for them (Han, 2006). Thus, UPREITs may have less flexibility in 
disposing less desired properties, depending on the voting rights of the 
OP unit holders, and may be constrained to grow. But at the same time, 
REITs that follow the UPREIT structure engage in tax advantaged 
acquisitions that helps in increasing its growth. We expect a positive 
effect of the UPREIT status based on the tax advantage it offers. 
c) Institutional Ownership: Being active long-term stockholders, Institutional 
investors are expected to better monitor and evaluate REITs‟ 
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management decisions than outside investors. Positive monitoring effect 
may help in firm growth decisions by management rather than managerial 
entrenchment.  In spite of the intuition that Institutional investors should 
have a positive effect on functioning of REITs, Friday et al. (1999) find no 
support for monitoring benefits by outside block-holders for REITs. Also, 
Ghosh and Sirmans (2003) find that institutional ownership fails to serve 
as an alternate disciplining mechanism, although their presence seems to 
enhance performance. Greater institutional participation may mean better 
growth prospects, though the same cannot be ascertained about better 
monitoring benefits. We expect a positive effect on growth even though 
institutional investors usually invest in large cap REITs. 
d) Insider Ownership: Higher proportion of insider ownership by the 
managers means better alignment of monetary incentives between 
managers and other shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
However, higher insider ownership also means increased managerial 
consumption of perquisites and tendency of managers to build their own 
empires. Though the research in this area has provided mixed results, 
most of the studies have found a significant non-linear relationship 
between firm performance and insider ownership (Morck et al. 1988; 
McConnell and Servaes, 1990). Han (2006) takes into consideration the 
dual ownership structure of common shares and operating partnership 
units in REITs and finds a similar significant and robust non-linear relation 
between REIT insider ownership and performance. We would also expect 
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a negative effect on growth at lower levels of insider ownership and a 
probable change in effect at higher levels. 
e) Geographic Focus: Some locations are more conducive to firm growth. 
REITs having properties in regions where there is large market demand 
are likely to experience high growth than REITs owning and managing 
properties elsewhere. Though Almus and Nerlinger (1999) contend that 
location is probably of secondary importance as it is closely associated 
with industry clustering, Davidsson (1989) argues that characteristics of 
the geographical area are important for industries where firms are bound 
to the local market. In case of REITs, Ambrose et al. (2000) have argued 
that geographic concentration does not translate to higher income growth 
rates.  
f) Management Structure (Self-managed): Most of the present day REITs 
are self-managed, which means that the management of REITs 
properties is performed by its employees. Thus, self-managed REITs 
have a better control and supervision on its activities and that may help in 
the growth of the REITs. Most of the times Self-advised and Self-
managed go hand in hand, but we still find some REITs that are self-
advised and not self-managed. These REITs that are self-advised but not 
self-managed are prominently found in the hotel and retail sector. We 
expect the self-management of REITs to have a positive effect on growth. 
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g) Management Style (Self-advised): Most of the REITs in the nineties 
changed its management style to “self-advised” with the passage of the 
Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986 that allowed REITs to have internal 
advisement. It is argued that since internal advisors have an ownership 
stake in REIT they advise, their interests are more closely aligned with 
the other stakeholders of the firm. On the other hand, agency issues are a 
concern in the case of externally advised REITs. This has been 
documented in terms of their underperformance, to their internally-
advised counterparts, based on stock returns and Tobin‟s Q (Cannon and 
Vogt, 1995; Capozza and Seguin, 2000). Thus, internally-advised have a 
superior ability to raise capital at better terms than externally-advised 
REITs that are more financially constrained due to weaker capital market 
access (Ambrose and Linneman, 2001). Hence, we expect internally 
advised REITs, with better access to funds, to grow more than the 
externally advised REITs. 
h) Liquidity/Cash-flow:  Financial means to grow can be accessed through 
various sources like retained earnings, short and long term borrowings 
and issuance of new shares. For REITs, finance is always a hurdle as 
they have to disburse 90% of its taxable income as dividends and have to 
look for external sources.8 But REITs still hold 1.57% of its total assets in 
cash and its cash holdings are directly related to cost of finance and 
                                                   
8 Though Hardin et al. (2009) assert that this restriction understates REITs actual ability to accumulate cash 
since the mandatory dividend is calculated as a portion of taxable income that is calculated after depreciation 
which is a non cash expense. 
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growth opportunities (Hardin et al. 2009). However, Ott et al. (2005) argue 
that internally generated capital would be insufficient to fund an 
aggressive growth strategy and REITs have to necessarily go to external 
sources for finance. Hence REITs are better off by disbursing cash and 
reducing the agency cost associated with free cash flow. We still expect a 
positive relationship with cash-flow as more of it would require REITs to 
procure a lesser amount from the external providers of finance. 
i)  Property Type: Different property sectors grow at different rates and 
hence the variation in growth rates can be attributed to the specific nature 
of the property sector in which the REIT operates. More prominent 
property types like retail, office and residential are expected to show 
better growth dynamics. 
j) Financing choice:  REITs need for capital and its unique regulatory 
environment makes them seek external sources of financing very 
frequently. Since REITs don‟t pay corporate taxes, they have no incentive 
to issue debt. Also, since REITs can‟t retain most of its earning, debt as a 
medium to mitigate information asymmetries has no apparent benefit. But 
still they tend to have persistently high leverage ratio of more than 50 
percent (Capozza and Seguin, 2001; Feng et al. 2007). According to 
Lang et al. (1996), there is a negative relationship between leverage and 
future growth at firm level for firms with low Tobin‟s q-ratio. But, they also 
find that leverage does not reduce growth for firms known to have good 
investment opportunities. This argument is supported for REITs by Feng 
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et al. (2007) who find that REITs with high growth opportunities and high 
market valuation raise funds through debt. In a more recent paper Huynh 
and Petrunia (2010) consider the role of financial variables in the growth 
of new firms in the Canadian manufacturing industry. They find that 
controlling for age and size, leverage has a positive effect on growth of 
new firms. The issuance of debt by REITs is also consistent with Pecking 
order theory which states that mangers prefer to fund investment with 
retained earning first, then debt and equity as the last resort. For REITs 
that have high asset growth, we expect a negative relationship with 
leverage.  
 Other factors that may affect firm growth include market competition, 
organizational form and capital market access.  REITs facing less competition may 
grow faster, REITs that have the backing of a bigger establishment may have better 
access to resources to grow, and REITs having better and easier access to 
financing have better prospects of growth. 
2.8 REIT literature on growth 
 Literature on firm growth in REITs is very limited. Most of the REIT‟s 
literature on growth has focused on the size of the firm and the issue of economies 
of scales by consolidation. Various researchers in the past have studied 
consolidation of REITs and the advantages that REITs enjoy due to its larger size. 
Those who support REITs‟ growth strategy through acquisition point out the 
efficiency gains in terms of lower operating expenses, higher income growth and 
lower cost of capital due to the larger size. Some studies have focused on the link 
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between the size of REITs and economies of scale. Bers and Springer (1998) 
examined the potential sources for economies of scale and provided evidence that 
G&A and management fees are reliable sources of economies of scale. The 
implication of their study is that the REITs in the consolidation path should seek 
targets that have larger percentages of total expenses in the G&A and management 
fees category. But these two expenses form only a small part of the total expenses 
of the REITs. Another study by Capozza and Seguin (1998) suggested that large 
REITs will outperform smaller REITs that are unable to achieve scale economies in 
property level expenses. Ambrose et al., (2000) studied the gains to consolidation 
due to economies of scale and contrary to the earlier two studies they found no 
evidence that large REITs have higher NOI growth rates. They concluded that the 
opposite holds and small REITs appear to generate higher NOI growth rates relative 
to large REITs. They found their results to be consistent with the findings of Noulas 
et al (1990), who found that scale economies exist for small banks but 
diseconomies exist for larger banks.  
 Till date, the empirical evidence regarding the effect of economies of scale to 
REITs growth through acquisition is mixed. The proponents of consolidation like 
Linneman (1997) and Scherrer (1995) view that the real estate industry will 
consolidate eventually and only a handful of large companies will survive. They 
believe that existence of economies of scale will motivate REITs to consolidate. 
Linneman (1997) noted that larger REITs can achieve greater shareholder value via 
economies of scale with respect to expenses. He also attributed the consolidations 
in the industry to the differences in the managerial ability. Vogel (1997) suggested a 
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contrary view and asserted that size advantages of lower operating costs and lower 
cost of capital are overestimated and may even reach a point of diminishing return. 
Vogel (1997) suggested that REIT growth was not related to the better operating 
efficiency of larger companies, but was a result of a host of external factors like 
regulatory changes and growth in institutional investment during the period of study. 
He suggested that size has never been an advantage in the real estate industry and 
the analogy of the massive consolidation in the steel and automobile industry may 
not hold good for the real estate industry. 
 REITs‟ consolidation approach to diversify geographically is also questioned 
by Campbell et al., (2001). In their study on REIT mergers they found that acquirer 
returns are slightly negative indicating that geographical diversification through 
mergers limit the opportunities for economies of scale. Another study by McIntosh 
and et al. (1991) found evidence against economies of scale. They found that the 
small REITs earn higher rates of return than larger REITs contradicting the 
efficiency gains by growing in size. Though Zell (1997) indicated that larger REITs 
have higher earnings growth potential, Yang (2001) presented evidence for non-
linear economies of scale suggesting that diseconomies of scale may exist for large 
REITs. Based on income growth Ambrose et al. (2000) indicated that small REITs 
NOI growth rates exceed average growth rates in the market and the large REITs 
are not able to generate sufficient economies of scale based on income growth. 
 Linneman (1997) tested for economies of scale in REIT capital costs and 
found that scale economies in capital for large REITs were twice as large as the 
scale economies for small REITs. Ambrose et al. (2005), contend that research 
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from the 1980‟s and the early 1990s may be misleading as they focused on very 
small REITs compared to the present REITs that have a large market capitalization. 
Also, regulation during the earlier period restricted the ability of REITs to raise 
sufficient capital to expand and capture any meaningful economies of scale. 
Whereas, research from the late 1990s and 2000s suggest that economies of scale 
exists, at least for larger REITs. 
  The only firm growth study we have come across in the REIT literature is by 
An et al. (2011) who examine the effect of transparency on firm growth. They 
suggest that greater corporate transparency facilitates firm growth by relaxing 
informational-based constraints on external financing. Some event studies in the 
REIT literature have documented wealth effects during the M&A announcement 
period for both acquiring and target REITs (Campbell et al., 1998; Campbell et al., 
2001; Sahin, 2005). But, firm growth studies are conspicuous by its absence in the 
real estate literature. Thus, further research is warranted in this field to fill this 
knowledge gap. 
2.9 Firm growth and profitability 
 Profitability remains a widely used measure of firm‟s success even though 
firm growth is also commonly seen as evidence of corporate success. Many 
theoretical models have assumed that more profitable firms will grow while the less 
profitable ones will decline (Nelson and Winter, 1982). The positive relationship 
between growth and profitability is justified as firms show poor financial 
performance and poor growth before it goes out of business. This was concluded by 
Wiklund (1998) who found that growth and financial performance tend to be 
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positively related to one another and that growth is a suitable strategy for firms that 
wish to improve its financial returns.  
 Majority of existing literature have separately focused on the evolution of firm 
growth or firm profitability and limited attention has been given to the relationship 
between these two variables (Davidsson et al, 2005). From a theoretical 
perspective, most of the firm growth theories in industrial economics and strategic 
management favor a positive relationship between firm profitability and growth. The 
arguments that support the positive relationship include economies of scale, 
learning effects (Stern and Stalk, 1998), market selection, first-mover or resource 
based advantages (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988; Davidsson et al, 2009). The 
evolutionary theory in economics also favors a positive association going from profit 
to growth (Nelson and Winter, 1982), supporting the “growth of the fittest” 
hypothesis. Another theoretical framework based on agency problem (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) proposes a negative relationship between these two variables in 
the long term. This is based on the separation of ownership and management of a 
firm that leads managers to maximize sales growth instead of profitability, leading to 
a trade-off between both variables after certain point. This sentiment is echoed by 
Ramezani et al (2002) who show that although corporate profitability generally rise 
with earnings and sales growth, an optimal point exists beyond which further growth 
destroys shareholder value and adversely affects profitability. Penrose (1959) 
argued (Penrose effects) that the firm productive resources that foster growth 
establish its own limits. As firm grows, there is an increasing need for coordinating 
new activities. But, due to the restriction in the available stock of managerial 
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resources, the average cost goes up leading to a decrease in profitability. Thus, 
“Penrose effects” suggests that growth may lead to reduction in profit rate as 
managers may start focusing on exploiting the growth opportunities which diverts 
their attention from keeping the operating costs down. 
 Empirical evidence that examines the relationship between firm growth and 
profitability is inconclusive and also fails to give the underlying causality of the 
relationship. The association between the two variables ranges from being positive 
and statistically significant (Cox et al, 2002; Cowling, 2004), weakly positive (Baum 
and Wally, 2003; Peng, 2004; Cho and Pucic, 2005), positive but not statistically 
significant (Roper, 1999; Sexton et al, 2000) and a significant negative relationship 
(Reid, 1995; Markman and Gartner, 2002). A meta-analysis of 320 past studies by 
Capon et al. (1990) revealed that growth (in 88 studies) was consistently related to 
higher financial performance with an average correlation of 0.13 between the two 
variables. However, the study also revealed that the positive relation was only found 
in across industry studies while the association was weak or non-existent in within 
industry studies. As a result, majority of the past studies do not clearly suggest that 
higher profitability is gained by firms that grow more than its direct competitors. 
Researchers have also got mixed results trying to answer the causality of the 
relationship i.e., whether growth leads to profitability or profitable firms are able to 
grow more. Using a resource based reasoning, Davidsson et al (2009) argued that 
profit drives firm growth and firms that expand without attaining profitability first tend 
to be less successful in subsequent periods. On the contrary, Coad (2007) found 
that past growth has a slightly positive influence on the subsequent profit rate. 
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Taking the middle path, Cowling (2004) has suggested a “cumulative causality” 
where growth drives profitability and profitability facilitates future growth. 
 In summary, theoretical perspectives put forward a positive profit-growth 
association where higher profitability leads to subsequent growth trajectory. This 
view holds the assumption that retained earnings are ploughed back to the firms‟ 
expansion. But, the empirical evidence on the relationship between firm growth and 
profitability is inconclusive and does not confirm to the theoretical expectations.  
Despite the theoretical arguments, there is little evidence of universal positive 
relationship between growth and profitability. This indicates that although the two 
dimensions of performance sometimes move together there are frequent other 
instances when the growth–profitability relationship is neutral or negative 
(Davidsson et al 2009). Thus, the relationship between growth and profitability is far 
more complex than the predictions made by the theoretical models. Added to this 
uncertainty is the REIT regulation of dividend disbursement that constrains REITs to 
plough back its earnings for further growth. But, REITs still have some retained 
profits as a source of capital as the mandatory dividend is calculated after taking the 
depreciation expense. Hence, profitability can be expected to drive REITs‟ growth. 
Also, REITs will find it easier to raise external capital if they are growing and a 
higher firm growth rate may lead to higher profitability through economies of scale 
and learning effects. Thus, we can also expect growing REITs to be more profitable. 
Although, there are strong reasons to believe the existence of a positive growth-
profitability relationship in REITs, it is not yet a confirmed fact. Hence, we undertake 
this empirical exercise to confirm this relationship in the case of REITs. 
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2.10 Research Hypotheses 
One of the main objectives of this study is to find the firm-specific 
determinants that have an impact on REITs‟ growth. Since we consider various 
determinants that may have a relationship with firm growth, it leads us to make a 
number of hypothesis which depict positive, negative or no relationship between a 
determinant and firm growth. Based on literature review, the hypothesized 
relationships are categorized into the following: 
Hypothesis 1: REIT‟s size, age and leverage have a negative relationship with 
REIT‟s growth. 
Hypothesis 2: UPREIT structure, Insider ownership, Institutional ownership, self 
managed & self advised REIT structure and cash flow have positive effect on 
REIT‟s growth. 
The dual-relationship between growth and profitability is still an unresolved issue in 
REITs. We would like to find whether financial performance is a good predictor of 
growth in REITs or whether asset growth leads to more profitable REITs? 
Hypothesis 3: REIT‟s asset growth leads to higher firm profitability. 
Hypothesis 4: REITs‟ profitability has a positive influence on firm growth. 
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3. Data and Methodology  
3.1 Data set and source 
 The initial sample includes all publicly traded US equity REITs covered by 
SNL Financial and that had its IPO during 1993 to 2005, both years inclusive. We 
also match the Equity REITs (EREITs) universe of SNL with those identified by 
NAREIT to verify the investment focus of REITs. Our sample period starts from 
1993 onwards as the new-REIT era (post 1992) is more representative of the 
present REITs‟ characteristics and is significantly different in ownership structure 
and management style to pre-1990 REITs (also see appendix).9  Also, during the 
early nineties dramatic changes happened in the REIT regulatory environment and 
with those changes REITs have predominately become actively managed (Ross 
and Klein, 1994). Institutional investors had limited role before 1993, but with the 
“look through” provision passed in 1993, REITs have attracted more investments 
from Institutional investors.10 Also, UPREIT structure was first developed in 1992 
and various debt-ridden real estate developers, in the early nineties, found this as a 
tax-deferred strategy to get the REIT status and finance its growth. 
 We have in our sample all equity REITs that are publicly traded, which 
includes listed (NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ) and unlisted REITs.11 We exclude 
Mortgage and Hybrid REITs as the number of these types of REITs have declined 
                                                   
9 Ott et al (2005) analyzed the differences in the old-REIT (1981-1992) and new-REIT eras (1993-1999) and 
concluded that the REIT sector experienced rapid growth in the new-REIT era. 
10 The Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1993 relaxed the five-or-fewer ownership rule for 
Institutional investors. 
11 We have around 60% of our sample firms listed on NYSE. 
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over the recent years.12 Also, we are interested to study the growth dynamics in 
REITs and equity REITs, which own and operate income producing properties, 
provide a better metric to measure growth than mortgage REITs. In addition to SNL, 
we also use Bloomberg, COMPUSTAT and firm‟s SEC filing (10Ks, proxy 
statements DEF 14A, 13-F filings) from SEC EDGAR database. Institutional 
ownership data for the sample REITs are collected from the historical 13(F) SEC 
filings and insider ownership data is computed from the manual tracking of the firm‟s 
DEF14A proxy statements yearly from 1993-2010 from each of the sample REITs‟ 
webpage. 
 We start with 167 equity REITs that were incorporated during 1993-2005. We 
restrict our sample to REITs that had at least three years data during 1993-2010.13 
We eliminate 9 REITs that had only one year of data and further eliminate 10 more 
REITs that had data for only two years. Following Hartzell et al. (2006), we eliminate 
22 REIT-years where asset growth rates are greater than 100%. We do this to 
mitigate the effect of extreme outliers due to mergers and acquisitions. The merger 
or take-over of a firm implies a substantial increment to the growth of the acquiring 
firm. Hence, we eliminate extreme growth rates in our sample. These eliminations 
reduce our sample to 148 unique public equity REITs with 1505 REIT-year 
observations. To eliminate survivorship bias, we retain in our sample REITs that 
were acquired, merged or delisted up to the time of its existence. The final sample 
consists of 148 equity REITs and is an unbalanced panel dataset.  
                                                   
12 According to NAREIT statistics, by the end of 2010, over 80% of publicly traded REITs were Equity REITs. 
13 A similar criterion of three years or more of data is used by Himmelberg et al. (1999) in their study on 
determinants of managerial ownership. 
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3.2 Variable definitions and Summary statistics  
 The variables used for the empirical investigation of determinants of growth 
in REITs are enumerated below. The summary statistics along with the variable 
description for the final sample are presented in Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1: Variable definitions and Summary statistics 
 
Table 3.2 shows the distribution of the sample across the study period, property 
focus, REIT‟s operating structure, REIT‟s management structure and management 
style. The table details both absolute and relative growth of total assets. The REIT-
year observations are highest in the years 1999 and 2000 and are more or less 
evenly distributed. Based on property focus, Industrial, Healthcare, Hotel and Office 
show relatively more annual average asset growth over the sample period. The 
distribution of sample by REIT structure shows that majority of the sample, around 
85%, comprised UPREIT structure REITs. Similarly, the distribution of samples by 
REIT management style and management structure shows that more than 95% of 
the sample consists of internally advised REITs and more than 85% of the sample 
comprises of self managed REITs. Running a t-test for mean equality, we fail to 
Variable Variable Definition No. of Mean Median Standard Min. Max.
name code Obs. deviation
Absolute Firm Growth TA_Gr Annual total asset growth [ln (TA i,t ) -ln (TA i,t-1 ) ] 1335 0.1457 0.0801 0.2592 -2.927 0.9872
Relative Firm Growth TA_Gr_rel Annual % change in Total assets [(TAi,t- TAi,t-1)/TAi, t-1] 1278 0.1476 0.0754 0.2365 -0.946 0.9992
Size TA Natural log of end of period total assets [ln(TA t ) ] 1505 20.769 20.792 1.353 10.954 24.2
MKTCAP Natural log of end of period Market Cap [MKTCAPt ) ] 1505 20.1 20.15 1.415 12.9 24.09
Age AGE Natural Log of one plus years since IPO 1505 1.757 1.856 0.733 0 2.94
Cash flow Sc_FFO Funds from Operation scaled by Total assets 1460 0.051 0.054 0.027 -0.201 0.1274
Leverage LEV Book value of Debt scaled by Total assets 1505 0.5159 0.5111 0.1724 0 1.618
Tobin's Q TQ (Market value of equity+ book value of Debt) 1505 1.145 1.119 0.2549 0.4865 2.39
Book value of total assets
REIT Structure UPREIT Indicator Variable, Equal to 1 if UPREIT, 0 otherwise 1505 0.8671 1 0.3395 0 1
Management Structure SELFMAN Indicator Variable, Equal to 1 if Self managed, 0 otherwise 1505 0.8564 1 0.3567 0 1
Management Style SELFADV Indicator Variable, Equal to 1 if internally advised, 0 if 1505 0.9681 1 0.1757 1 1
externally advised
Institutional Ownership INSTIOWN % of total O/s shares owned by Institutional Investors 1380 0.6 0.6396 0.2742 0.0006 1.281
Insider Ownership INSIDOWN % of total O/s common shares and OP units owned by 1122 0.1262 0.091 0.1207 0 0.826
Directors and executive officers as a group
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reject the null hypothesis of mean equality of total asset growth by REIT structure, 
advisor type and management style type. This test result suggests that the 
difference in the growth of REITs is not significantly influenced by those variables. 
Table 3.2 Sample distribution of REITs 
 
The correlation matrix for the variables in this study is presented in Table 3.3. The 
correlations support many of the expected relations. REIT asset growth is 
significantly and negatively correlated with firm size (proxied by total asset), firm 
age and leverage. Firm growth is significantly and positively correlated with scaled 
cash flow (funds from operation/total assets) and Tobin‟s q. Ownership by 
1) Time Distribution 2) Property type Distribution
Average Total Assets Growth Average Total Assets Growth
Year # of Obs Relative Absolute Prop Type # of Obs Relative Absolute
1994 37 0.3353 0.316 Diversified 43 0.1834 0.1578
1995 78 0.2478 0.2079 Healthcare 54 0.1670 0.1834
1996 80 0.2933 0.2812 Hotel 157 0.1462 0.1667
1997 84 0.4099 0.4202 Industrial 69 0.2142 0.1807
1998 96 0.358 0.3535 Residential 246 0.1513 0.1506
1999 101 0.1168 0.1134 Office 239 0.1318 0.1572
2000 101 0.0244 0.0061 Retail 373 0.1189 0.1061
2001 92 0.0375 0.0333 Specialty 154 0.1893 0.1620
2002 85 0.0749 0.0599
2003 81 0.0874 0.0934
2004 81 0.1265 0.1048 3) REIT Structure Distribution
2005 84 0.2058 0.1968 Average Total Assets Growth
2006 75 0.1388 0.1506 REIT Stucture # of Obs Relative Absolute
2007 67 0.1137 0.1207 UPREIT 1161 0.1413 0.1407
2008 65 0.0338 0.0281 Non-UPREIT 174 0.1895 0.1788
2009 64 -0.0114 -0.0153
2010 64 0.0372 0.0279
4)  REIT Management Structure Distribution 5) REIT Management Style Distribution
Average Total Assets Growth Average Total Assets Growth
Mgmt Structure # of Obs Relative Absolute Mgmt Style # of Obs Relative Absolute
Self-managed 1150 0.1517 0.1499 Self-advised 1293 0.1468 0.1453
Ext-managed 185 0.1215 0.1196 Ext-advised 42 0.1728 0.1578
This table presents the distribution of the sample across time, property type, structure, management and style of REITs used in the
determinants of firm growth analysis. The sample consist of 1,335 REIT-year observations for 148 publicly traded US equity REITs
that had its IPO during 1993-2005 and traded during 1993-2010. REITs are classified into eight property categories by regrouping the SNL
classification. The eight categories are Diversified, Healthcare, Hotel, Industrial, Residential (Multi–family), Office, Retail (Regional mall, 
shopping center and Retail) and Specialty (Storage, Manufactured homes, etc.).
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institutional investors has a small significant influence on REIT‟s asset growth and 
insider ownership has small positive but insignificant effect on growth. 
Table 3.3 Correlation of key variables 
 
Variables  
 a) Size: We use annual data of the natural log of Total assets (TA) as our 
main proxy for firm size. Alternate measures of firm size such as real estate value, 
total market capitalization and total recurring revenue are also considered in order 
to check the robustness of our results. The distribution of size measure is log-
normal. We lag this measure in the regression equation. 
 b) Age: Firm age (AGE) is measured as the number of years since the initial 
public offer. Firm age is assumed to have a non-linear impact on firm growth. 
Hence, we include a squared age term in the regression equation. The average age 
of the sample is 5.86 years. We lag this measure. 
Growth Size Age Leverage Sc_cashflow Tobin's Q Insti Own Insider Own
Growth 1.0000
Size `-0.0362*** 1.0000
Age `-0.3945*** 0.5112*** 1.0000
Leverage `-0.2350*** 0.1970*** 0.3066*** 1.0000
Scaled Cash flow 0.0683** `-0.0880*** 0.0406 `-0.1922*** 1.0000
Tobin's Q 0.2368*** 0.0515* 0.0678** 0.1740*** 0.2240*** 1.0000
Institutional Ownership 0.0057** 0.5291*** 0.2570*** `-0.1479* `-0.0486*** 0.1866*** 1.0000
Insider Ownership 0.0081 `-0.2417*** `-0.1157*** 0.2106*** 0.0366* `-0.1282*** `-0.4921*** 1.0000
This table presents the pair-wise correlations of the variables used in the regression model.
Size and Age are in Natural logs. Size is measured by Total assets. Other definitions of variables are given in Table 3.1.
***, ** and * refer to the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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 c) Firm Growth: We use the absolute measure of firm growth (TA_Gr) as the 
dependent variable, which is calculated as the change in the logarithm of total 
assets between the current year and the previous year.  
   TA_Gri,t = ∆ ln (TAi,t) = ln (TAi,t) – ln (TAi,t-1) 
where i = 1,….., N are firms‟ labels and t = 1993,…, 2010 is our sample period 
The distribution of asset growth rate is right-skewed across the sample of REITs 
with a sample mean and median equal to 14.57% and 8.02% respectively. This 
indicates that several REITs in the sample grow at a high rate relative to others in 
the sample. The periods between 1993-1999 and 2003-2006 were high growth 
periods for REITs in terms of asset acquisition. The period during 2006-2009 is 
characterized by decreasing growth in total assets due to the credit crunch that was 
created by the financial crisis. The debt exposure of REITs coupled with the 
increasing cost of funds led many REITs to shelve their asset growth plans soon 
after the crisis. We also use a relative measure of firm growth (TA_Gr_rel) which is 
the annual percentage change of total assets. 
 d) REIT Structure: We use a dummy variable (UPREIT) for the REIT 
structure. UPREIT is assigned a value of one if the REIT is an UPREIT, zero 
otherwise. We identify REIT as an UPREIT or non-UPREIT at the time they enter 
the sample and change the code if the REIT changes its structure midway. Most of 
the REITs entering in the new-REIT era are UPREITs. By the end of 2010, we had 
over 80% of REITs that had the UPREITs structure in our sample. 
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 e) Institutional Ownership: We take the percentage of the total shares owned 
by institutions according to 13F filings.  Due to options and OP units the sum of 
shares owned by institutions may appear greater than 100%. Average ownership by 
Institutional owners (INSTIOWN) by the end of year 2010 was 81.34%.  
 f) Insider Ownership: We measure insider ownership (INSIDOWN) as the 
common shares owned by all insiders i.e., all Directors and executive officers 
divided by the total common shares outstanding. The security ownership details of 
the company management are obtained from Definitive Proxy Solicitation Material 
(DEF14A) proxy statements filed by the company with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC).  We also take the square of insider ownership to capture the 
non-linear relation between firm growth and insider ownership. The average insider 
ownership by the year end 2010 for our sample of REITs was 9.01%.   
 g) Management Structure (Self-managed): Self-managed (SELFMAN) is a 
dummy variable which is equal to 1 if it is internally managed and 0 otherwise.  
Around 85% of our sample by the end of 2010 comprises of self-managed REITs. 
 h) Management Style (Self-advised): Self-advised (SELFADV) is again a 
dummy variable equaling 1 if internally advised and 0 otherwise.  Majority of the 
sample, slightly more than 95%, comprises of internally advised REITs and gives 
support to Ambrose and Linneman‟s  (2001)  findings that the externally advised 
REITs are on the decline. Public and listed REITs are typically self-managed and 
self-advised, whereas public but non-listed REITs are typically externally managed 
and advised. 
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 i) Liquidity/Cash-flow: We use Funds from Operation (FFO) to measure the 
liquidity of REITs. We take the FFO value as reported by the company for the 
period, which is typically calculated as GAAP net income excluding gains or losses 
from sales of properties or debt restructuring, and adding back real estate 
depreciation. FFO can be highly correlated with size measures such as total assets 
and hence we reduce this effect by scaling the cash measure by total assets 
(Sc_FFO) and lag this measure in the regression equation. 
 j) Property Type: Since, growth rates of REITs differ based on the property 
focus, we control for different property sector effects. As REITs specialize in 
different property markets we classify REITs into eight property categories by 
regrouping the SNL classification. The eight categories are Diversified, Healthcare, 
Hotel, Industrial, Residential (Multi–family), Office, Retail (Regional mall, shopping 
center and Retail) and Specialty (Storage, Manufactured homes, etc.). Diversified is 
used as the reference case in the regression. 
 k) Financing choice: Leverage (LEV) is measured as the ratio of firm‟s total 
debt to total assets. We lag this measure to examine the effect of leverage at the 
beginning of the year on firm growth. Average leverage for our sample is 51.59%. 
 l) Tobin‟s Q: We use the Tobin‟s Q (TQ) as a proxy for growth opportunities. 
Carpenter and Petersen (2002) argued that TQ needs to be incorporated in the 
growth equation as TQ is the growth opportunity estimated by the market. We adopt 
Perfect and Wiles (1994) measure of Tobin‟s Q, which is calculated as the sum of 
the market value of equity and the book value of debt, divided by the book value of 
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the firm‟s total assets.14 We lag this measure so that investment opportunities 
available at the beginning of the year can be used to predict investment during the 
year. The average value of the proxy for Tobin‟s Q is 1.145. 
Consistent with previous studies, we control for firm and year fixed effects for some 
models.  
3.3 Research design 
 Based on Hall (1987) and Evans (1987), we begin our empirical tests with 
standard growth size regressions and compare models obtained by adding 
covariates. The growth equation is a function of initial firm size, age and a 
stochastic error term. 
TA_Gri,t = β0 + β1ln(TAi,t-1) + β2ln(AGEi,t-1) + β3ln(AGEi,t-1)
2 + εi,t                              (1)    
and   εi,t = ρεi,t-1 + µi,t, where µi,t is a random disturbance assumed to be iid and “ρ” 
captures persistence of chance or serial correlation in µ i,t . We include the squared 
age term variable to reflect the non-linear impact of firm age on firm growth. 
Model 1 is a simple model in which firm growth is regressed on logarithm of lag of 
total assets and logarithm of lag of age. We take the lag of both size and age 
variables as we want the beginning of period values in our regression equation and 
the data we have is for the end of period. The following empirical model serves as 
the baseline model to study the impact of other determinants on firm growth: 
                                                   
14 Perfect and Wiles (1994) measure of Q has a correlation of 0.93 with that estimated using Linderberg and 
Ross (1981) approach which takes the replacement costs of assets into consideration. The latter approach 
though more accurate is more cumbersome to compute. 
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TA_Gri,t = β0 + β1ln(TAi,t-1) + β2ln(AGEi,t-1) + β3ln(AGEi,t-1)
2 +β4(LEVi,t-1) + 
β5(Sc_FFOi,t-1) + β6(TQi,t-1) + βj(Control Variablesj,t) + εi,t                  (2) 
Next, the effect of Institutional and insider ownership on firm asset growth is 
examined by including these variables in the baseline equation. 
TA_Gri,t = β0 + β1ln(TAi,t-1) + β2ln(AGEi,t-1) + β3ln(AGEi,t-1)
2 +β4(LEVi,t-1) + 
β5(Sc_FFOi,t-1) + β6(TQi,t-1) + β7(INSTIOWNi,t-1) + β8(INSIDOWNi,t-1) + βj(Control 
Variablesj,t) + εi,t                                                                                (3) 
We use panel data regression instead of OLS to avoid heterogeneity bias as 
the variation in REIT asset growth is partially caused by REIT specific unobservable 
factors. We employ Hausman‟s specification test to examine whether the 
unobservable heterogeneity is correlated with independent variables and to 
determine whether fixed effects model is preferable to random effects model. The 
test produces a chi-squared statistics of 33.89 with a p-value of zero. The Hausman 
test result suggests that fixed method model specification is preferable for our data. 
Time-invariant variables like UPREIT, property type and advisor type are dropped 
from the fixed-effects model. In order to include the time-invariant variables in the 
model, we also report the results using the random-effects methodology. Annual 
dummy variables controlling for time-effects are included in both fixed and random 
effects model. We select the robust standard errors in Stata to calculate t-statistics 
corrected for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. 
Unfortunately, while estimating firm growth regressions, the right hand side 
variables are endogenous and measured with error. Also the simultaneity between 
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asset growth and some regressors lead to correlation between the regressor and 
the error term.  Use of instrumental variables is also problematic as the only 
instruments available are lagged values of the right hand side variables. In panel 
data the correlation of these variables with the error term remains even after the 
firm-level means of the dependent variable have been removed. Usually, this 
problem is solved by taking the first difference (growth rates) for estimation instead 
of within firm correction. But, the measurement error of variables may tend to bias 
the first differenced coefficients more towards zero than does the within-firm 
estimator (Griliches and Hausman, 1986). To account for the serial correlation 
between the lagged regressor and the error term, we make use of the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM)-system estimator, which is a dynamic panel data 
technique developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). “System-GMM” panel data 
estimator controls for the presence of unobserved firm specific effects and gives 
unbiased and consistent estimates in presence of endogenous explanatory 
variables. The standard error estimates from GMM estimation are also robust to the 
presence of correlation across equations and heteroscedaticity. Hence, System-
GMM is appropriate for our study as it is robust to correlation of error terms within 
firms and heteroskedasticity across firms.  
3.4 Growth and Profitability 
 A final test would be to examine the relationship between profitability and 
growth. Again, we resort to GMM-system estimator as the explanatory variables 
here are endogenous, i.e. there is a bi-directional causation between the dependent 
and independent variable. In such a condition OLS regression yields biased and 
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inconsistent estimates as it requires the explanatory variables to be orthogonal to 
the residual error term. The problem of endogeneity can also be resolved by using 
instrumental variables that are uncorrelated with the error term but are correlated 
with the explanatory variable. But, if the instrument variables are weak, then the 
regression estimates are again biased and inconsistent. To overcome this problem, 
Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed a GMM estimator for panel data in which 
regression equations are expressed in terms of first differences (eliminating time-
invariant firm-specific effects) and endogenous explanatory suitable variables are 
instrumented with suitable lags of their own levels. Though this estimator can give 
far better results than the previously used methods, it has its shortcomings if used 
for our purpose. The high persistence in profitability can give rise to weak 
correlation between the lagged levels of the endogenous variable and differences of 
the explanatory variables. In such a case the instruments included by the estimator 
are not useful and this leads to large finite sample bias. Hence, an improved panel 
data estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and further developed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998) is used. Arellano and Bover (1995) constructed a panel 
data GMM estimator in which the regression equations are in levels and the 
additional instruments are expressed in lagged differences. Blundell and Bond 
(1998) further developed this by augmenting the original differences GMM estimator 
with the level equation estimator to form a system of equations known as “System-
GMM”. In the context of our study, system-GMM is best able to deal with 
endogeneity and firm-specific effects and can give unbiased and consistent 
estimates.   
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4. Results and Discussions 
4.1 Growth characteristics of REITs 
 This study provides the first comprehensive study of firm growth rates in 
publicly listed US equity REITs. We undertake this study to examine the 
heterogeneity of REITs‟ growth dynamics by plotting the distribution of firm growth 
rates. We document the growth rates of REITs using different growth indicators and 
describe their distribution across age, size and property types over different time 
periods. Since firm growth is a dynamic measure of change over time and a multi-
dimensional phenomenon (Delmar et al, 2003), we use different growth measures 
that are suitable to the REIT sector. We use growth indicators in terms of inputs 
(Real estate investment), in terms of the value of the firm (total assets and market 
capitalization) and outputs (Recurring revenue and Funds from Operation). We also 
use the data to examine the survival and growth profile of a cohort of new REITs 
over ten years. A detailed examination of the evolution over a decade of 90 REITs 
founded in 1993 and 1994 is conducted and its pattern of asset and revenue growth 
is analyzed. We identify the pattern of growth for all firms and categorize their 
growth as episodic or continuous. We compare the survival of high growth firms with 
those of slower growth firms. While roughly one half of all firms founded in 1993-94 
survived the ten year period, the survival rate of high growth firms for the same ten 
year period was 90%. 
To examine the characteristics of REITs with different asset growth rates, we 
classify the observations into 3 groups (low, moderate and high growth), based on 
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average asset growth over two consecutive years. Table 4.1 reveals that REITs with 
high growth rates have lower asset base compared to REITs that show low growth 
rates. This confirms that smaller REITs (based on total assets) grow faster than 
larger REITs. Also, from table 4.1 we can see that the mean age of REITs growing 
at a higher rate is 2.75 years as compared to 8.77 years for REITs that grow at a 
lower rate. We also look at the characteristics of young and established REITs 
separately in table 4.2.  When we check the mean (median) growth rate of REITs 
based on REITs age below five years (young) and more than five years (mature), 
we find that younger REITs grow at a higher rate of 30.41 percent (24.09%) as 
compared to the mature REITs that grow at a rate of 6.72 percent (3.62%). This 
again confirms the stylized fact that younger REITs grow at a faster rate. We also 
perform the t-test of difference in means and find that all the variables except scaled 
cash flow are statistically significant. 
Table 4.1: Growth characteristics of REITs by growth rate 
 
 
Full  Sample Low growth Moderate growth High growth
TA_Gr< = 5% 5% < TA_Gr <= 30% TA_Gr > 30 %
Total assets (million USD) 1071.24 1515.71 1161.15 636.13
Age (years) 6.32 8.77 6.84 2.75
Market Cap (million USD) 569.07 687.3 632.3 419.62
Real estate Inv (mill USD) 999.64 1448.89 1071.57 594.09
Recurring rev (mill USD) 155.46 241.29 165.54 75.68
FFO (mill USD) 56.07 68.08 67.79 30.92
Total Debt/Tot assets 0.5111 0.5488 0.5128 0.4641
Total Equity/Tot assets 0.3839 0.3417 0.3793 0.4318
Institutional ownership 0.6006 0.6328 0.5931 0.5711
Insider Ownership 0.1262 0.1228 0.1258 0.1339
This table provides the sample characteristics of REITs with low, moderate and high growth rates.
The definition of variables is given in Table 3.1
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Table 4.2: Growth characteristics of REITs by age 
 
4.1.1 Growth rate distribution 
 We start with an analysis of the distribution of growth rates in the entire 
population of REITs operating over specific time periods. Using the data from this 
distribution, we delve on growth characteristics of young REITs.  To analyze the 
growth rate, we allocate the firms in one of the seven growth intervals from less 
than -10% to more than +40% annualized growth rate per annum. Since, we are 
interested in the growth profile in the new REIT era, we focus on three year period, 
viz, 1995-1997 and 2005-2007 in each of the last two decades.15 We choose these 
two periods for the following reason: during 1993-94 and 2003-04, the REIT industry 
saw a wave of REIT IPOs. Since, our focus is young REITs, choosing this time 
period will enable our sample to be well represented by new REITs. In these two 
periods, we have included only those firms that were in existence at the beginning 
of each period and have not included the firms that were born in the first year of 
each period. We identify 91 and 101 REITS surviving over each period 1995-97 and 
                                                   
15 We use growth rates over three years to be consistent with the organization of economic cooperation and 
development‟s (OECD) definition of high-growth firms.  
Full  Sample Young Firms Established Firms Mean
Age<=5 years Age>5 years Difference
Asset Growth 0.1647 0.3041 0.0672 `-0.2369***
Log (Total assets) 20.7698 20.1426 21.3239 1.1812***
Log (Market Cap) 20.1012 19.569 20.5714 1.0023***
log(Real estate inv) 13.8086 13.1834 14.3615 1.1781***
Log (Recurring rev) 11.911 11.1889 12.5482 1.3592***
Scaled FFO 0.05186 0.0529 0.0505 `-0.0021
Debt/Tot assets 0.5159 0.4722 0.5545 0.0822***
Equity/Tot assets 0.3839 0.4241 0.3485 `-0.0755***
Institutional ownership 0.6006 0.5432 0.6446 0.1013***
Insider Ownership 0.1262 0.1409 0.1199 `-2.09226**
This table provides the sample characteristics of young and established REITs.
REITs below the age of 5 years are considered young. The mean values are shown for the variables.
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2005-07 respectively. Specifically, we look at the distribution of growth rates in total 
assets and revenue for the firms over the two three-year periods, 1995-97 and 
2005-07, breaking it down by firm size and age. 
Figure 4.1: Distribution of Firm growth rates by Total assets 
 
Figure 4.2: Distribution of Firm growth rates by Revenue 
 
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 present the distribution of the three year firm 
growth rates in terms of total assets and recurring revenue respectively. Looking at 
the two graphs, it is evident that growing firms are overrepresented in REITs sector 
which supports the conclusion of Gallagher and Miller (1991) who confirm the 
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overrepresentation of growth firms in certain industries like services, finance and 
distribution. For total assets, we see that for the sub-period 1995-97, bulk of the 
distribution (around 66%) is concentrated in the over 20% growth interval compared 
to around 33% in the same growth interval of the sub-period 2005-07. Furthermore, 
the distribution is different between the two time periods. In the earlier 1995-97 
period just over 5 % of the REITs exhibited low growth (growth interval 1-10%). 
However, in the more recent 2005-07 period, the proportion of firms registering a 
small growth in total assets in the same growth interval shot up to around 35 
percent. The shape of the distribution in terms of revenue looks similar in both the 
sub-periods to that of the shape of the asset growth distribution. Overall, in 2005-07 
we observe that there is a significant rise in the number of firms experiencing low 
growth in total assets as well as revenue. Probably, the REIT sector is witnessing a 
shift from being high growth industry to a more mature industry. We try and dissect 
the reason for the low levels of growth in the latter sub-period and find that the 
average age of the firms in the earlier period was 7.3 years as compared to the 
average age of 14.13 years in the latter sub-period. This supports the stylized fact in 
firm growth literature that younger firms grow faster than older firms. Since, our 
focus is young REITs, we further investigate the characteristics of the high-growth 
REITs in its early years. 
According to OECD, a high-growth firm is defined as a firm with an average 
annualized employment or turnover growth rate exceeding 20 percent per annum 
over a three year period and with ten or more employees at the start of the period. 
Therefore, we now look at firms that have annual revenue growth rates that exceed 
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20% over each of the three year periods. The revenue profile of the high-growth firm 
shows that majority of the high growth firms are smaller in size in both sub-periods. 
This again supports the stylized fact that smaller firms grow at a faster rate. When 
we look at the share of gazelles in the high-growth firms, we find that their share 
has drastically come down from 73% in 1995-97 to 27% in 2005-07.16 Since, 
majority of high growth firms in the sub-period 2005-07 are well established firms, 
we can say that gazelles are not a common feature of the high growth firms in the 
latter sub-period. This is probably due to more number of young REITs in the earlier 
period sample. But, this brings us to the next important question of survival of these 
young and high growth firms. What happens to these gazelles after their intensive 
growth period? Do they continue on their growth surge or slow down, stagnate or 
decline? When we take a look at the 40 firms that were gazelles in the sub-period 
1995-97, we find that 36 firms (90%) survived till the sub-period 2005-07 and out of 
40 REITs that were gazelles in 1995, only 2 maintained its high-growth status in 
2005. Thus, firms growing at high rates in early years survive longer, but rapid 
growth is not sustainable in the longer run. For US small businesses, Headd and 
Kirchhoff (2007) found that the year after fast growth, 55 percent of fast growers 
declined in employment versus the universe's 25 percent. This gives us a fair idea 
that rapidly growing REITs may not be able to sustain its growth levels for a long 
time and hence the growth trajectories of young REITs requires further exploration. 
 
                                                   
16 Gazelles are a subset of high-growth firms with less than five years in business at the beginning of the three-
year time period. This term was coined by Birch (1981). 
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4.1.2 Growth trajectories, Growth persistence and REIT’s survival 
Since, the analysis of growth over the three year period does not give a full 
picture of the development path of REITs, we conduct a detailed examination of the 
1993 and 1994 cohort of new REIT entrants. We focus on the dynamic evolution of 
the cohort of REITs over ten years after firm incorporation and examine how they 
have actually achieved growth. Out of the 90 equity REITs that had its IPO in 1993 
and 1994, only 50 survived their ten years of operation. Using the annual growth 
rate in total assets of these 50 surviving REITs, we analyze its growth for each year 
for the next 10 years. We also look at the timing of the high growth instances in 
those ten years to ascertain whether the high growth occurs immediately after the 
IPO listing or whether it occurs when REITs are more established. To examine the 
high growth instances of the cohort, we code the growth rates for each year into 
four categories: High growth (year-on-year asset growth, Gr >30%), Moderate 
growth (5%<Gr<30%), Low growth (0%<Gr<5%) and Negative growth (Gr<0%). Out 
of 50 new surviving REITs in the 1993-94 cohort, 45 (90%) recorded one or more 
annual instances of high-growth in the 10 year period after its inception. The first 
five years of the REIT incorporation also witnessed multiple annual high growth 
instances and these episodes drastically reduced beyond five years of REITs‟ 
existence. Also, achieving high growth in consecutive years was not rare in young 
REITs (less than five years old) whereas it was rare for better established REITs. 
Timing wise, REITs experience an annual spurt of high growth when they are young 
i.e., they are less than five years old and high growth instances are comparatively 
less in more established REITs. Thus, REITs grow extremely fast when they are 
young. For the first three years the surviving REITs grew by 42.16 percent on an 
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annualized basis. After the initial spurt, the growth slowed and over the latter seven 
years the 1993-94 cohort of REITs averaged about 14.6 percent annualized growth. 
This observation also supports the negative relationship between age and growth 
presented in the existing literature. 
Growth Trajectories 
We trace new REITs‟ growth trajectories to examine if any typical growth 
trajectory exists for these young REITs. To map the growth path we again make use 
of the 1993-94 cohorts of young REITs surviving over the 10 year period. Data 
points were obtained for total assets growth by coding for growth reduction greater 
than 5%, for increase in growth greater than 5% and for change in either direction of 
less than 5 percent. Depending on the key turning points, the growth patterns were 
categorized as a) Continuous growth; b) Growth setback; c) Early growth and/or 
Plateau; d) Delayed take-off; and e) Erratic growth.17 From table 4.3 and figure 4.3, 
it is evident that in the early years around 51% of the surviving REITs grew 
continuously over the five year period. Another 6% grew continuously after a 
delayed start and another 25% stagnated after an initial growth period, while the 
remaining 14% faced growth setbacks during their early life cycle. The 10 years 
growth trajectory shows a stark difference compared to the early stage of growth. 
Majority (around 45%) of REITs had a growth setback and another 30% stagnated 
after an initial growth period. There were very few REITs (around 14%) that could 
sustain a continuous growth. 
 
                                                   
17 We adopt the growth pattern methodology and nomenclature developed by Garnsey et al (2011) 
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Figure 4.3: Typical growth paths of young REITs 
The figure shows the typical growth paths taken by the cohort of 1993-94 REITs over its nascent 
years. 
 
Table 4.3: Growth trajectories of REITs over 5 and 10 years 
 
The following analysis clearly shows that new firm growth is uneven and 
rapid growth in the early years of REITs is liable for reversal in the long run. Growth 
surges are more commonly seen in the early years when REITs are under pressure 

















































Delayed take-off & Growth (6%)
Growth Trajectory 1993 Cohort 1994 Cohort All REITs 1993 Cohort 1994 Cohort All REITs
Continuous growth [C] 69.57 34.62 51.02 21.74 7.69 14.29
Growth setback [S] 8.70 19.23 14.29 47.83 42.31 44.90
Early growth and Plateau [P] 13.04 34.62 24.49 21.74 38.46 30.61
Delayed take-off and growth [D] 4.35 7.69 6.12 4.35 7.69 6.12
Erratic growth [E] 4.35 3.85 4.08 4.35 3.85 4.08
This table traces the growth path taken, over 5 and 10 years, by a cohort of REITs that had its IPO in 1993 and 1994.
The numbers denote the percentage of REITs in the each cohort that had a particular trajectory of growth.
5 years 10 years
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resource shortages and other growth induced problems. Also, over the longer term, 
sustained growth is rare as can be seen by the growth trajectories of REITs over the 
ten year period. Though, during the early years REITs typically show continuous 
growth trajectory, there is no typical growth trajectory followed by majority of REITs 
over the long term. However, it does not follow that growth happens as a result of 
chance factors, but there are some consistent factors that can explain the REITs‟ 
growth path and hence its survival.  
REITs Survival 
We use the 1993-94 cohort of newly established REITs to study the effects of 
age, size and financial variables (leverage and profitability) on firms‟ survival 
probabilities. The survival rate (figure 4.4) of 52% over a decade shows relatively 
good survival performance of US equity REITs compared to the 30% survival rate of 
US manufacturing firms found by Phillips and Kirchhoff (1989) for 1980s and Headd 
(2003) for the 1990s for a ten year period.  
Figure 4.4: Survival of REITs: 1993-94 Cohort 
The figure shows the survival rate of the cohort of 1993-94 listed REITs over ten years. Data for 
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We use a simple Probit specification to estimate the incidence of failure in 
REITs.18 Following Evans (1987) and Zingales (1998), we estimate the following 
Probit model for the probability of firm failure on our pooled data set:  
FAILEDi,t = β0 + β1ln(TAi,t-1) + β2ln(AGEi,t-1) + β3(LEVi,t-1) + β4(PROFITi,t-1)+ εi,t           (4) 
where “i” is the firm‟s label and “t” time. FAILED is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
firm i failed in quarter t, and 0 otherwise. We define a REIT as failed in a particular 
quarter if the firm has filed for bankruptcy, voluntarily dissolved/de-listed, merged 
with another firm or acquired by another firm. “TA” represents the size of the firm 
and is measured as the logarithm of total assets. AGE is the logarithm of number of 
years since the firm‟s initial public offer. Smaller and younger firms may face a 
higher risk of failure and hence we expect the failure rate to decrease with size and 
age. We include two financial variables in the model to ascertain its effect on firm 
survival. Leverage (LEV) is measured as the firm‟s short-term debt to asset ratio. 
Profitability (PROFIT) is measured as the ratio of firm‟s profit before interests and 
taxes to its total assets. Higher leverage results in higher failure probabilities 
(Zingales, 1998) and we expect REITs with higher leverage to face greater 
difficulties in obtaining external financing to survive. We anticipate a positive 
relationship between profitability and firm survival as more profitable REITs have 
better access to capital and are less likely to fail. We lag the regressor (t-1) as the 
data we have is for the end of year. We take into account the time effects by 
including time dummies in our model.  
                                                   
18 The hazard of exit can also be estimated using proportional Cox hazard specification, but we make use of a 
simple probit model in our study. 
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 Table 4.4 shows summary statistics of the variables likely to influence firm 
survival. Surprisingly, surviving firms are younger than the failed firm-years. We 
expected firm failure to decrease with firm age. Surviving firm-years are generally 
larger than the failed firm-years i.e., smaller firms are more likely to fail. In terms of 
financial variables, failed firm-years have higher leverage and slightly lower 
profitability compared to the surviving ones. 
Table 4.4: Summary statistics for REITs’ survival 
 
Table 4.5 reports the results of estimating equation (4) using Probit 
specification. Column 1 presents the estimation results of the cohort of equity REITs 
established in the years 1993 and 1994. The results suggest that there is a positive 
and significant association between REIT‟s age and the probability of its failure. 
This result is contrary to the findings in the existing literature about younger firms 
Full  Sample Surviving Failed Mean
firm-years firm-years Difference
Age 4.97 4.96 6.09 `-2.113*
[0.0576] [0.0580] [0.4681]
Total assets  (Mill. USD) 1487.2 1493.87 1041.19 1.4485**
[39.38] [39.92] [125.03]
Log(Total assets) 20.4884 20.4894 20.4243 0.4579
[0.0205] [0.1355] [0.1355]
Leverage 0.5231 0.5227 0.5535 `-1.1925
[0.0031] [0.0031] [0.0213]
Profitability 0.0177 0.0177 0.01633 1.6934**
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.1355]
Observations 3051 3006 45
This table provides the sample characteristics of the 1993-94 cohort of REITs that survived or failed
in the first ten years after its IPO. Age is the number of years since REIT's IPO. Total assets denotes
the size of the firm.  Leverage is measured as the firm’s short term debt to asset ratio. Profitability
is measured as the ratio of firm’s profit before interest and taxes to its total assets. The table reports 
the sample mean and std. dev are presented in the paranthesis. * and ** indicates significance level 
at 10% and 5% repectively.
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being more likely to fail. We attribute this discrepancy to the fact that we consider a 
small cohort of REITs that was established in 1993 and 1994. In our robustness 
check (column 2 of table 4.5), we include all the firms established after 1993 and 
find that younger firms are more likely to fail. As expected, larger firm-years and 
more profitable REITs are less likely to fail. Leverage ratio does not seem to 
significantly affect REITs‟ survival probabilities. The Probit analysis results for all 
equity REITs established after 1993 is presented in column 2 of table 4.5. Apart 
from the age variable which has a negative and statistically significant coefficient, 
other variables display similar coefficients to those obtained from the 1993-94 
REITs cohort. Hence, we can conclude that REITs‟ failure rate decreases with firm 
age, size and profitability.  
Table 4.5: Probit model for REITs’ failure 
 












This table provides the estimation results for the probit analysis for the
incidence of failure. 1993-94 cohort refers to the REITs established in 1993
and 1994. The 2nd column includes all REITs that were formed after 1993.
* and ** indicate the significance level at 10% and 5% level respectively.
Standard error is reported in the paranthesis.




To check whether there is persistence in growth, we look at the “Growth-
Growth” formation, i.e., a year of growth followed by another year of growth in our 
1993-94 cohorts. We see that the “Growth-Growth” sequence was the most 
common sequence representing 48% of all two paired sequences in the sample. 
Also, around 78% of the sequences beginning with an incidence of growth were 
followed by a second period of growth, whereas only 38% of sequences beginning 
with a plateau were followed by growth. This clearly reflects that growth is 
conducive to further growth. We will return back to the question of persistence of 
growth in more detail in the empirical analysis section. 
4.1.3 Financing of growth 
Financing is an important issue for any firm to sustain growth. The funding of 
growth is especially crucial for younger REITs as they are more resource 
constrained. The 90% dividend distribution clause puts constraint on the ability of 
REITs to retain earnings for future growth and thus REITs predominantly depend on 
external sources of financing.19,20 During the early 90‟s the growth of equity REITs 
was attributable to significant increases in the initial public offerings (IPOs) and 
secondary equity offerings (SEOs). Though in later years the IPO activity declined 
considerably, the secondary equity offerings soared high throughout the nineties. 
Equity capital was favored during the early nineties, but it gave way to debt 
financing from 1999 onwards (figure 4.5). This was until late 2007 when the markets 
                                                   
19 Though Hardin et al. (2009) assert that this restriction understates REITs actual ability to accumulate cash 
since the mandatory dividend is calculated as a portion of taxable income that is calculated after depreciation 
which is a non cash expense. 
20 Francis et al. (2004), observe that REITs access capital markets more frequently than most industrial firms. 
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were hit hard by the credit crunch and debt was hard to get in the market. Also, 
capital structure of the firm becomes important in setting growth targets for the firm. 
Firms‟ high leverage can reduce the ability to finance future growth. In extreme 
cases, a firm‟s debt overhang can be large enough to prevent it from raising funds 
to finance positive NPV projects (Myers, 1977). Lang and et al (1996) find a 
negative relationship between leverage and future growth at firm level for firms with 
low Tobin‟s q-ratio. But, they also find that leverage does not reduce growth for 
firms known to have good investment opportunities. 
Figure 4.5 Financing patterns of equity REITs (1993-2010)  
This figure presents the use of debt and equity by REITs over the sample period 
 
In order to examine how young REITs finance its growth, we follow Baker 
and Wurgler (2002) and find out on average how much of growth in assets after IPO 
is driven by different financing choices (table 4.6). Under their definition, change in 
assets in a given year is equal to the sum of net debt issues, net equity issues and 
newly retained earnings. We find on average, up to five years after the IPO, the 
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by net equity issues and 6% by newly retained earnings. Ten years after the IPO, 
the proportion of debt increase to 70%.This supports the claim of Feng et al (2007) 
who show that REITs on average have a debt ratio of above 65% ten years after its 
IPO. This result also lends support to Ott et al (2005) who document that REITs 
finance 93% of aggregate investment externally and the retained earnings account 
for 7% of the investment.  The higher debt ratio reflected in the capital structure of 
REITs is more consistent with the pecking order theory, which predicts use of least 
costly source ( retained earning first followed by debt and equity as the last option) 
to finance growth opportunities.  
Table 4.6: Current leverage ratio and changes in current leverage ratio 
 
Where, Book leverage = Book debt/total assets  
Market leverage = Book Debt/ (Total assets - Book equity + market equity) 
Net Debt issues (d/A) % = Residual change in assets/Assets 
Net equity issues (e/A) %= (change in book equity - change in b/s retained earnings)/Assets 
Newly retained earnings (∆RE/A) %= change in retained earnings/Assets 
Change in Assets = Net Debt issues +Net Equity issues + Newly retained earnings 
The financing option of low and high growth REITs is also evident from table 4.1. 
Low-growth REITs on an average have a debt-ratio of 55% compared to 46% debt-
Year N Mean S.E Mean S.E Mean S.E Mean S.E Mean S.E
IPO 141 40.25 1.82 32.88 1.46 0.4027 6.4 0.2064 5.11 -0.012 0.83
IPO+1 132 46.01 1.7 38.82 1.49 0.2735 1.83 0.1042 1.47 -0.0109 0.17
IPO+3 127 48.07 1.63 41.48 1.53 0.1574 2 0.07451 0.95 -0.0153 0.28
IPO+5 124 47.63 1.67 42.9 1.65 0.1122 2.03 0.0451 0.74 -0.0143 0.27
IPO+10 96 49.92 1.65 38.54 1.47 0.1294 1.82 0.0326 1.1 -0.0578 0.28
Book Leverage D/A % Market Leverage % d/A % e/A % ∆RE/A %
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ratio of high growth REITs during the period 1993-2010. On the other hand, equity-
ratio, for the same period, by low-growth REITs is around 34% compared to 43% by 
high-growth REITs. 
4.2 Growth determinants: Panel regression results 
 Table 4.7 presents the panel data regression results for the determinants of 
REITs‟ growth. Models 1 and 2 estimate equation (1) and (2) respectively, while 
models 3 through 5 estimate equation (3) and its variations using fixed effects and 
random effects (when time-invariant variables are used). Since, Weinzimmer et al. 
(1998) suggest relative or percentage change in firm size to be a better method to 
measure firm growth, we also run our panel regressions with the relative measure of 
growth as the dependent variable (results not reported). Results from panel 
regressions show that the estimated coefficient of firm size (as measured by log of 
total assets) and firm age, in all the models, are significantly and negatively related 
to firm growth (at 1% level). These findings suggest that smaller and younger REITs 
grow faster than the larger and older ones. These results are consistent with the 
stylized facts found in the firm growth literature and rejects Gibrat‟s law of 
proportional effect. Gibrat‟s law of proportionate growth asserts that probability of a 
proportionate increase in firm size over an interval in time is the same for all firms, 
regardless of their size at the beginning of the interval. The negative relationship 
between firm growth and size (TA) clearly suggest that Gibrat‟s law does not hold in 
the case of REITs and the relationship between growth and size is not a stochastic 
phenomenon. The negative growth-age relationship in our sample is consistent with 
the Jovanovic‟s (1982) theory of passive learning. We also include a squared age 
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variable in the models to examine the non-linear impact of age on firm growth. The 
positive coefficient on the squared age variable suggests a non-linear relationship 
between age and growth which means that younger firms experience faster growth 
than their older counterparts, but up to some threshold age. Thus, firm growth 
decreases with firm age for younger firms but eventually increases with firm age for 
older firms. 
 The results provide strong evidence of an inverse relation between asset 
growth and leverage. Leverage is significantly and negatively related to growth 
suggesting that firms with high leverage would not be able to take advantage of 
growth opportunities. This result is similar to many studies on capital structure that 
have shown that increased leverage reduces firm‟s ability to raise additional funds 
to invest (Myers, 1977; Auerbach, 1985; Lang, 1996).21 The results further show 
that REITs‟ asset growth is positively and significantly related with cash flow. This 
finding suggests that REITs that are usually financially constrained value its excess 
funds from operation and utilize it to further its growth objectives. 22 Tobin‟s „q‟ also 
shows a similar significant and positive relationship with firm growth. REITs having 
more growth opportunities grow more. We can also use Tobin‟s „q‟ to measure 
asymmetric information. REITs that have less asymmetric information have better 
access to capital markets to raise funds. Given that REITs are dependent on 
external funds for asset acquisitions, a positive relationship between Tobin‟s „q‟ and 
                                                   
21 Unlike Titman and Wessels (1988), we do not make any distinction between long-term, short-term and 
convertible debt. 
22 Hardin and Hill (2008) suggest that REITs that generate excess funds from operation pay out more 
dividends. Since, REITs necessarily require additional capital from both equity and debt market for future 
growth, by paying excess dividends from excess FFO it reduces the agency costs which in turn reduce its cost 
of capital.   
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asset growth suggests that less asymmetric information or greater transparency 
leads to improved capital market access which makes asset investments easy. 
Institutional Ownership is positively and significantly related to asset growth 
in REITs. With more institutional participation in REITs, more funds are available for 
REITs to invest and grow its assets. In models 3 to 5, the estimated coefficient of 
insider ownership is negative. However, the coefficient is non-significant in all 
models. Since, the existing literature has recorded a non-linear relationship between 
performance and REIT‟s insider ownership, we consider the square of insider 
ownership as an additional regressor. We find the coefficient of the squared insider 
ownership variable to be positive and significant at 10% level. This indicates that the 
rate of asset growth for REITs is smaller for lower levels of insider ownership. But, 
higher level of insider ownership has a positive and significant impact on the asset 
growth of REITs. The results support Han (2006) findings that the firm value of 
REITs increase with insider ownership, but at a decreasing rate. This clearly 
indicates that at higher values of insider ownership, the alignment of monetary 
incentives between managers and other shareholders gives way to tendency of 
managers to build their own empires in the form of asset acquisitions. Thus, the 
results seem to be in line with the trade-off between the incentive alignment and the 
entrenchment effect of insider ownership. 
 We use indicator variables to test for the effect of UPREIT status, self 
advisement style and self management structure of REITs in model 4 and model 5. 
The coefficient for UPREIT structure is positive but insignificant. This shows that 
UPREIT structure does not seem to influence growth of assets in REITs. Usually, 
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the conflict of interest comes in the UPREIT structure REITs at the time of disposing 
properties. The sale of property triggers tax liability for the operating partnership 
holders and if these unit holders have representation in the management/board or 
have influence in decision making in general, then we can expect more property 
acquisitions rather than dispositions. Since, the unit holders do not have the same 
voting rights as the common shareholders, we do not see any significant impact of 
UPREIT structure on asset growth in REITs. Self managed REITs show a positive 
and significant relationship with asset growth indicating that REITs managed by its 
own employees show more inclination to grow by asset acquisitions. The self 
advisement style dominates the REIT industry and is a result of the capital market 
pressure that has forced the external advised REITs, with inherent agency 
problems, to change into self advised REITs (Ambrose and Linneman, 2001). In 
models 3 to 5, the estimated coefficient of self advisement is negative indicating that 
the rate of growth is smaller for self-advised REITs compared to externally-advised 
REITs. Self advisement structure does not seem to influence growth of assets in 
model 4. The insignificant and negative coefficient for self advisement structure is 
contrary to our expectation that self advised REITs with less agency issues will be 
able to finance its capital at lower cost and grow more. Though self-advisement 
becomes statistically significant at 5% level in model 5, it still holds the negative 
sign. The change in significance in model 5 may be due to omitted variable issue in 
model 4. The negative sign for the coefficient in both model 4 and 5 implies that 
externally advised REITs are more aggressive in asset acquisitions as compared to 
its self advised counterparts.  
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Since, different property types have dissimilarities in their investment cycle, 
REITs‟ property focus may have an impact on its asset acquisitions. Dummy 
variables categorizing property types are used in model 5 to control for the different 
property type effects that may impact the growth rates. Since, we use an intercept in 
our model we leave diversified property type out of the model. The results are not 
conclusive as compared to the reference group (diversified property type) none of 
the other property types significantly impact asset growth in REITs. The panel 
regression results are similar when relative measure of firm growth is taken as the 
dependent variable, except that the scaled cash flow variable becomes insignificant 
(results not reported). We check for the robustness of the results by taking market 
capitalization as the proxy for firm size. We find similar results that support our 
findings. The results are quantitatively similar to what we find with the full sample 
and hence the results are not reported. We also carried out ordered probit analysis 
to verify the results for different growth rates. The results are not reported here as 
they are not quantitatively different from our panel data results. 
 Since, our interest is in young REITs, we conduct the panel data regressions 
for the sample of REITs that are less than 5 years of age (Table 4.8). All the 
variables have the same influence on firm growth for young REITs except that age 
becomes insignificant. Size has a significant and negative relationship with growth. 
Again, Gibrat‟s law does not hold for young REITs. Age in this regression is 
insignificant as we are looking into a small age group of REITs. Leverage again 
shows strong significant and negative relationship with growth. This indicates the 
constraint on young REITs that have a high debt to get additional funds to invest in 
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its asset growth. Cash flow has a significant positive influence on the growth of 
young REITs. This is especially beneficial for young REITs as any amount of cash 
flow in excess of the mandatory dividend disbursement can be utilized to grow 
assets. Institutional ownership has a significant positive effect on asset growth of 
young REITs. The backing of a large equity investor at an early life-cycle stage of 
REITs not only helps in getting the much needed finance for growth but also 
provides a monitoring mechanism. Insider ownership shows a non-linear 
relationship with growth. At higher levels of insider ownership, young REITs grow 
more. UPREIT structure, self management structure and self-advisement style are 
used as indicator variables. Self management structure is positively and significantly 
related to growth even in young REITs. UPREIT structure and self advisement style 
are not significantly related to growth. But, self advised REITs show a negative 
influence to asset growth. None of the property types show any significant influence 
on firm growth of young REITs.  
We also check for the persistence of firm growth as measured by “ρ” (rho) 
and previously mentioned in equation (1). We use the test statistics of ρ = 0 as 
suggested by Baltagi and Wu (1999). We find the coefficient of ρ = 0.393>0 and 
Baltagi-Wu LBI (Locally Best Invariant) test statistic equal to 1.86. The Baltagi-Wu 
LBI statistic is equivalent of the Durbin-Watson statistic and is a relevant test for 
serial correlation. Since the Baltagi-Wu LBI statistic is not very much below 2, it 
indicates slight positive persistence in growth rates i.e., above average growth in 
one period tends to persist into the next.  
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Table 4.7: Panel Data regression results (Whole Sample) 
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Table 4.8: Panel Data regression results (Young REITs) 
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4.3 Growth determinants: GMM-System results 
Table 4.9 presents the GMM system results for growth determinants of 
REITs. We find GMM method to be more suitable to our study as it controls for 
biases due to unobserved firm-specific effects and lagged endogenous variables. 
Also, GMM estimators produce more reasonable estimates of the autoregressive 
dynamics than the general first-differenced estimators in case of persistent series 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998). For these reasons, we focus our discussion on the GMM 
system results. GMM system results are similar to our panel data regression 
findings. Column 1 gives the GMM-sys results for the whole sample. Since, we are 
interested in the growth determinants of young REITs, we split the sample by firm 
age (young REITs < 5 years and mature REITs >5 years) and report the GMM-sys 
results in column 2 and column 3 of Table 4.9. The estimated coefficient of size in 
column 1 is negative and significant (-0.3421), indicating that smaller REITs grow 
faster than larger ones during our sample period. We find the same result for young 
and mature REITs in column 2 and column 3. According to Wald joint test (wjs), 
which tests the joint significance of the estimated coefficients, we reject at 1% 
significance level the null hypothesis that coefficients of size and past growth are 
zero.  Hence, we reject Gibrat‟s law of proportionate growth for our sample of 
REITs. As expected, the coefficient of age in column 1 is negative (-0.4061) and 
significant at 1% level. Hence, younger REITs grow faster than mature REITs. We 
also test for non-linearity in growth-age relationship and find that there is reversal of 
negative relation at certain age. But, the age variable is not significant in case of 
young REITs. 
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We look for the persistence of chance by looking into the serial correlation in 
proportionate growth rates (coefficient of growthi,t-1). The estimated coefficient for 
serial correlation is positive and significant. This indicates that there is no 
persistency in growth. But when we look at the coefficient of growthi,t-1 in young 
REITs we find it to be negative and significant. Thus, for younger REITs growth 
encourages growth i.e., firms that grew faster in the past will grow faster in the 
present. In the case of mature firms growth in one period may or may not tend to 
persist in the next period. 
 Leverage is again negatively and significantly related to asset growth for 
both young and mature REITs. When we look at the significance of cash flow for 
both young and old REITs, we find that the estimated coefficient for the cash flow 
variable is slightly higher for younger REITs. This signifies that cash flow plays a 
much more important role in younger REITs than in mature REITs as younger 
REITs are more financially constrained due to liability of newness and smallness. 
This is especially true for younger REITs that can‟t hold on to most of its earnings 
and are more often constrained for funds to grow as a result of mandatory dividend 
disbursements. 
Percentage of ownership by institutional investors aids in the asset growth for 
both young and mature REITs. But, as compared to panel regression, we find the 
influence of insider ownership in GMM system results to be insignificant. This 
indicates that percentage insider ownership has no influence on the growth 
characteristics of REITs. 
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Table 4.9: GMM-system results 
 
4.4 Growth and Profitability – Dual relationship 
 We first investigate the effect of profitability (RoAA- Return on Average 
Assets) on subsequent growth by estimating the following regression: 
TA_Gri,t = β0 + β1(RoAAi,t-1) + β2(Controli,t-1) + εi,t                                                (5) 
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Where β0, β1 and β2 are parameters to be estimated and εi,t are i.i.d. error terms. 
RoAA represents the return on average assets of firm i in year t. The control 
variables are lagged firm size, lagged RoAA and year dummies. We also add 
leverage as a control variable to control for method of financing.  
We report the system-GMM estimates in table 4.10. 23 We first test the 
validity of the instruments used by reporting Hansen „J‟ statistic of the over-
identifying restrictions. The corresponding p-value for the Hansen statistic are high 
(0.338), hence we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are 
exogenous. Another key identifying assumption is that there is no serial correlation 
in the εi,t disturbances. This can be examined by testing for no second order serial 
correlation in the first differenced residuals. Although first order autocorrelation is 
present, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no AR(2) serial autocorrelation as the 
p-value is 0.411. Thus, System GMM is considered suitable for this study. From the 
results we detect a small positive (0.03) and statistically significant influence of 
profits on the asset growth. The lower value of the coefficient maybe due to the fact 
that REITs have to disburse most of its profits as dividends and have to necessarily 
go to external sources for financing growth. This also supports the findings of 
Ghosh and Sirmans (2006) who show an inverse relation between dividends and 
return on assets indicating that REITs with superior performance retain earnings to 
finance future investments. 
 
                                                   
23  We acknowledge Roodman (2006) for writing the code “xtabond2” of system-GMM for Stata and making it 
available to all users. A similar code “xtdpdsys” is now available in Stata 11. 
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Table 4.10: System GMM regression results- Effect of profit rate on growth 
 
 “Penrose effects” (1959) suggests that growth may lead to reduction in profit 
rate whereas „increasing returns‟ predicts that growth will lead to higher profit rate 
due to economies of scale that reduces the unit cost. Also, from resource-based 
view, growth may lead to increases in profit if organizational slack that was under-
utilized previously is used. Thus, we would like to verify the influence of growth on 
profitability in REITs. The system-GMM estimator is not appropriate here as it is 
difficult to find suitable instruments for growth rates as they are quite random. 
Hence, we estimate the following regression using fixed effects:  
RoAAi,t =  β0 + β1(TA_Gri,t-1) + β2(Controli,t-1) + εi,t                                               (6) 
We use similar control variables as before. The fixed-effects regression results 
(Table 4.11) indicate a small but positive and significant influence of growth on profit 
rates. According to the estimates, an increase in the growth rate of assets of 1% 
Dependent Variable: Asset Growth(t)
p-values
Profit rate (t-1) 0.0297*** 0.0108
AR(1) z-stat and p-value -4.99 0.0000
AR(2) z-stat and p-value -0.82 0.4110
No.of instruments 44
Hansen J stat 29.47
d.f and p-value 27 0.3380
Observations 1051
This table presents the GMM-sys regression results for the profit indicator RoAA
and growth indicator of total asset growth.
*** refers to the statistical significance at 1% level.
Chapter 4  Results and Discussions 
79 
 
over the period t-1: t leads ceteris paribus to an increase in profit rate at time t of 
about 0.011%. Thus, growth produces increasing returns that has a slight positive 
influence on subsequent profit rates. We reject the proposition of “Penrose effect” 
and support the “increasing returns” argument as we find that asset growth in REITs 
lead to a higher profit rate which may be due to economies of scale and learning 
opportunities. 
Table 4.11: Fixed effect regression results- Effect of growth on profits 
 
 






This table presents the fixed-effects estimate of 
the effect of growth on profits.
*** refers to the statistical significance at 1% level.




5.1 Summary of main findings 
 A plethora of empirical studies on firm growth have found evidence linking 
firm growth to firm attributes such as size and age. Proving or disproving Gibrat‟s 
law has been the hallmark of most of these growth studies. Previous studies have 
focused on firm specific attributes in the manufacturing sector to explain the 
observed heterogeneity of growth rates. This study provides econometric evidence 
on the relationship of firm growth to firm specific attributes in the REIT sector using 
the GMM-system estimator technique. We also look at the unresolved issue of 
growth and profitability using the GMM estimator. System-GMM estimators are well 
suited for our study as it overcomes problems of endogeneity, persistence and 
unobserved firm-specific effects. 
 Examining the growth characteristics of REITs, we find that high-growth 
REITs are smaller and younger than other REITs. Also, new REIT growth is uneven 
and there are turning points in new REITs‟ growth path that may lead to growth 
stagnation or growth reversals. New REITs that experience high growth in its early 
years are most likely to survive longer, but sustained growth among REITs beyond 
five years is rare. REITs failure rate declines with size and age and growth is 
conducive to further growth. 
Looking at the growth strategies of REITs, we document that REITs achieve 
growth in a number of different ways (organic, acquisition, development etc.) and 
the pattern of growth differs across REITs based on demographic characteristics, 
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financing choices and ownership structure. The firm specific determinants of growth 
in REITs include size, age, leverage and cash flow. These determinants have an 
impact on the differential growth of REITs. We also document a positive impact of 
institutional investors and no influence of insider ownership on REIT‟s growth. 
Though self managed REITs show a positive influence on asset growth, self 
advised REITs show a negative relation with asset growth. 
Our results are in close agreement with the previous empirical findings. Our 
findings support path dependency feature of firm growth (Coad, 2009). Gibrat‟s law 
that postulates independence between firm growth and size is rejected and 
Jovanovic‟s model that predicts a negative relationship between firm growth and 
age holds for our sample. The inverse relationship between growth and leverage is 
consistent with many capital structure studies. Our findings are consistent with the 
idea that small and young firms that face liquidity and financing constraints are more 
sensitive to the availability of cash flow. We also identify a small positive effect of 
profit rates on subsequent growth and the positive influence of growth on profit 
rates. Thus, we reject the proposition of Penrose effect which suggests that growth 
may lead to reduction in profit rate. The results are also valid for different 
specifications that account for ownership structure and REIT structure. Finally, our 
findings emphasize the need to account for firm growth‟s simultaneous dependence 
on size, age and financial conditions. 
5.2 Contributions and Implications 
 Firm growth in REITs has never been examined in the existing literature like 
we have done by documenting the growth characteristics and its determinants. This 
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study is a starting point that provides a better understanding of the phenomenon of 
firm growth in the REIT sector. We study the growth dynamics of REITs by mapping 
the growth trajectories and growth persistency in young REITs. This study makes 
an empirical contribution to the growth literature by finding the organizational 
determinants that are found to be most important for REITs‟ growth. Our empirical 
findings should be treated as a new beginning to develop a more complex model 
that incorporates other managerial determinants to REITs‟ growth. This study also 
contributes to the literature of firm growth and profitability.  
 This study has implications for managers and investors alike. This would help 
managers to make investment decisions that would be beneficial to improve the firm 
value for the shareholders. This would also help managers to make prudent growth 
strategies depending on the firm resources. Investors can also benefit from this 
study  in terms of making better informed investment decisions. The study has 
some implications for regulators who can frame policies to help firms survive in 
difficult market and also to safeguard the interests of the investors. For 
academicians, this study will give a push for growth studies in the real estate sector 
and open the floodgates for further research on issues like corporate governance, 
capital structure, etc., that would incorporate firm growth as an important parameter. 
5.3 Limitations and future research recommendations 
 The present study is not without limitations. Firm growth is a complex 
phenomenon and it can‟t be explained by one particular dimension or determinant. 
Since, we focus on the firm specific determinants only, the characteristics of 
managerial traits like work experience, educational background and motivations are 
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not considered in this present study. Though these managerial attributes are equally 
important to a firm‟s growth, we reserve his issue for further research in the future. 
Also, we focus our study to empirical investigations of growth in publicly listed equity 
REITs. Public REITs may face certain pressure from investors to grow larger as is 
the case with most of the publicly listed firms. Thus, in our sample larger firms may 
be overrepresented leading to certain sample bias. We also do not investigate 
interlinks between the different growth indicators. Also, profitability measures used 
in examining the growth-profit nexus comes from accounting balance sheet and 
depends on the validity of these figures as reported by the firms. 
In future, the effect of external growth strategies (acquisition vs. 
development) on the performance of small and young REITs that face financial 
constraints can be studied further. An in-depth empirical examination of the 
differential impact of various growth strategies on growth and performance can be 
undertaken. Given the importance of managers in new venture growth, inclusion of 
manger‟s characteristics into our study would be more fruitful. The relationship 
between firm asset growth and subsequent stock returns is another area to look 
into. We can study if asset growth rates are strong predictors of future abnormal 
stock returns. Finally, our research is a beginning step to the firm growth study in 
REITs, even though it focuses on REITs growth in USA. The application of the 
results to other emerging REIT markets would provide further insights into growth 
dynamics of REITs worldwide. 
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A1. A Brief history of emergence of REITs in USA 
The journey of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) began in 1960 when 
the US congress passed the Real estate investment trust act. The intention of its 
creation was to enable small investors to pool their resources and participate in 
diversified and large scale income producing real estate. Its goal was to provide a 
convenient way for an average investor to participate in the large real estate 
properties that had been, till that time, the domain of the wealthy investors and large 
institutions. In effect, it served as the mutual fund for real estate, enabling 
individuals to invest in large institutional grade real estate with the added benefits of 
liquidity, portfolio diversification and regular income. 
But, it was not until the1990s that REIT as an investment vehicle saw a surge 
in interest, which resulted in its explosive growth that has remained unabated for the 
past two decades. Over the last decade, REITs have grown dramatically both in the 
US and in other global markets. Many countries have introduced REITs to improve 
the efficiency and transparency in its real estate market. The market capitalization, 
at the end of 2009, of REIT industry worldwide (Figure 1) was around $560 billion, 
with US alone accounting for around $271 billion (Dec 2009, Ernst and Young, 
Global REIT report, 2010). But, this still represents a small percentage of the 
commercial real estate market worldwide and provides plenty of opportunity for 
REITs to grow in the future. 
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Figure 1: Global presence of REITs 
 
     Source: Ernst & Young, Global REIT report 2010 
REITs had an unexciting start during the 1960s and grew very slowly in 
terms of assets and share price appreciation during its formative years. In its early 
years, REITs were constrained by policy limitations as they were permitted only to 
own real estate and not to operate or manage it. This called for an arrangement with 
asset management companies whose economic interests did not necessarily match 
with the REITs‟ owners. REITs were thus handicapped by the policy limitations to 
be mute investors in real estate. The stock market crash of 1962 put the brakes on 
the future prospects of the fledgling industry. Though, the REIT industry saw some 
limited growth during the following years, many investors were still ignorant of the 
benefits of its investment structure. The beginning of 1970s saw a dramatic change 
in the growth pattern of REITs. The sudden interest in REITs, with more mortgage 
REITs being created, is attributed to the tight monetary policy resulting in high 
interest rates and limited available funds for construction and development loans by 
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traditional mortgage lenders. By 1972, construction and development loans 
accounted for over half of the REITs investments.24 Thus, during the early period, 
industry was dominated by mortgage REITs (Figure 2) that provided debt financing 
directly to real estate owners or operators or indirectly through acquisition of loans 
or mortgage backed securities.  
Figure 2: Evolution of US REITs in 1970s and 1980s 
 
                       Source: NAREIT 
The equity REITs were initially limited as the ownership and management of 
assets were required to remain separate. This rapid growth turned into rapid decline 
by 1973 as the oil embargo and the subsequent national recession hit the real 
estate industry and builders defaulted on the loans made by REITs. Many REITs 
went out of business and some dropped their trust status. According to REIT fact 
book, the industry‟s asset base declined from around $20billion to less than 10 
billion and remained there for a long time during this period of economic downturn 
(Figure 3).  
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Figure 3: Stagnation in Asset base 
 
                                    Source: REIT Fact Book 1986 
The tax reform act (TRA) of 1986 triggered the dramatic growth of REITs and 
brought about a sea change in the investment landscape of real estate. Prior to 
enactment of TRA, real estate limited partnerships had provided means for tax 
shelters rather than investment vehicles for stable growth. Since REITs, unlike a 
partnership, was not permitted to pass losses to its investors, the REIT industry 
could not effectively compete for investment capital against the tax shelters. The 
new laws drastically reduced the potential for real estate investment to generate tax 
shelter opportunities (Imperiale, 2002). The 1986 legislation allowed REITs to own 
and operate income generating commercial properties, thus minimizing the conflict 
of interests of REITs operators and investors.  
The 1990s represented the most remarkable growth spurt for the REITs. The 
TRA of 1986 and the housing recession in the early 1990s helped REITs get into 
the mainstream. Cash strapped real estate companies that had survived the 
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recession had no choice but to go public to access capital and REIT structure gave 
them the perfect mechanism. New York based Kimco Realty raised $128 million in 
its 1991 IPO, thus opening the floodgates for REITs. The introduction of UPREIT 
structure also encouraged a number of real estate companies to go public. The next 
few years that followed showed an unprecedented growth for REITs. From 119 
REITs at the end of 1990, the numbers grew to 226 at the end of 1994 (NAREIT). 
REITs unprecedented growth during this period was in part due to the strong 
interest in REITs as lower risk, higher yield investments in a traditionally volatile real 
estate sector. The two years during 1993-94 saw a REIT IPO boom that made 
REITs a household name (Figure 4). This completely changed the makeup in favor 
of equity REITs from mortgage REITs which had dominated the industry till 1993.  
Figure 4: IPO boom during 1993-94 
 
              Source: NAREIT 
During the subsequent years, the industry saw a lot of consolidation with 
REITs getting bigger to enjoy the economies of scale. The 1990s is considered by 
some industry observers as the initiation of the modern era of REITs. This decade 
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led to a relatively long and sustained growth in the REIT asset class (Imperiale, 
2006). This dramatic growth in the number of REITs can be seen in the figure 5. 
Figure 5: Progression of REITs 
 
Source: REIT.com 
Despite a number of regulatory reforms, REITs were required to operate 
under limitations in the ancillary services provided to the tenants. In 1999, the REIT 
modernization act was passed that allowed REITs to own up to 100 percent of a 
taxable REIT subsidiary. This allowed REITs to provide substantial services to 
tenants, as well as others, without jeopardizing the REIT‟s legal status (Block, 
2006).  This act also changed the minimum distribution requirement from 95 percent 
to 90 percent of a REIT‟s taxable income. In 2001, REITs were included in the S&P 
500 index that gave further impetus to its widespread acceptance. Inclusion of 
Chicago based Equity Office Properties in a well followed index like S&P 500 was 
considered to be an invitation to a bigger investment platform (Gordon, 2008). 
Today, around 14 REITs are a part of S&P 500 index, which is a good indication of 
its market strength. REITs have also become a popular investment vehicle due to 







1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
Total # of Public REITs
  Appendix 
99 
 
outperformed most other major market benchmarks over the past four decades 
(Figure 6).  
Figure 6: REIT Performance (in percent) 
 
                        Source: NAREIT 
The REIT improvement act of 2004 allowed foreign investment in publicly 
traded US REITs and also provided the ways of monetarily penalizing REITs 
instead of stripping the firm of REIT status when the REIT rules were breached. 
This contributed to the widening of the investor base for REITs and brought in more 
institutional investors into the REIT market. REITs have grown rapidly over the first 
half of the twenty first century mainly because it is widely accepted now as a more 
transparent and an efficient structure for real estate investment. The upswing in real 
estate cycle during this period has also helped spark the REIT growth. REIT 
Investment and Diversification act was passed in 2008 to allow REITs to buy and 
sell assets more efficiently and it also increased the size of taxable REIT subsidiary. 
The industry also has a wide choice of professionally managed, public as well as 
private REITs in many different sectors (Figure 7). The REIT industry is growing and 
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evolving by adding more specialty sub-sectors to its portfolio. All these strides made 
on the legislative front have given a boost to the growth in REIT market.  
Figure 7: REITs investment in different Property Sectors 
 
                                                                                                  Source: NAREIT 
                                                                                                               
 
1960 REITs were created by the REIT act by Congress  
1972 NAREIT started the first REIT index
1976 Tax reform act, REITs simplification ammendments allowing REITs to be established as 
corporations in addition to business trusts
1986 Tax reform act, New rules that prevented taxpayers from using partnerships to shelter 
earnings from other sources.
Allowed REITs to own and operate income generating commercial properties
1991 REIT IPO of $128 million by  New York based Kimco Realty 
NAREIT adopted the definition of Funds from Operations (FFO)
1999 REITs modernization act, allowed REITs to own taxable REIT subsidaries
2001 Equity Office Properties, a Chicago based REIT was included in S&P 500 index
2004 REIT improvement act, allowed foreign investment in publicly traded US REITs
2008 REIT invstment and diversification act, allowed REITs to buy and sell assets more 
efficiently, increased the size of taxable REIT subsidiary
2010 50 years of REITs
Major milestones in REITs history in United States
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A2. Structural changes in US REITs: 1960-2010 
 
 A3. Legal requirements for US REITs 
 
Passive investment vehicle Operating company
Externally managed Internally managed
Developer sponsors Institutional sponsors
Small management Large management
Diversified portfolio Specialized portfolio
Small capital base Large capital base
Traditional structure UPREIT structure
Little analyst coverage Extensive analyst coverage
Adapted: McMahan J (2006). The handbook of commercial
real estate investing (1st edition). McGraw-Hill, Irwin.
1960-1992 1992-2010
Requirements Specific stipulation
Asset Ownership * At least 75% of the value of REIT's asset must consist of real estate 
(including mortgages), government securities and cash
* Not more than 5% of the value of assets may comprise securities of any
one issuer, if the securities are not included under the 75% test
* No more than 20% of the REIT's assets can consist of stocks of taxable 
REIT securities
Income generation * At least 75% of the gross income must be derived from rents, interest
on obligations secured by mortgages, gains from sale of certain assets or
income attributable to investments in other REITs
* No more than 30 % of the the REIT's gross income can be derived from 
sale or disposition of stock or securities held for less than six months or
real property held for less than 4 years except for property involuntarily
converted or foreclosed on
Income distribution * At least 90% of the REIT's taxable income must be distributed to  
shareholders on an annual basis
REIT structure and ownership * The REIT must be structured as a corporation or a business trust 
* Must be managed by board of Directors or trustees
* Minimum of 100 shareholders
* No more than 50% of a REIT's shares may be held by  five or fewer 
individuals during the last half of a taxable year
* Ownership by institutional investors such as pension funds does not
violate five or fewer rule
